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Abstract 
 
Title of Dissertation: ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC PASSENGER FERRY SAFETY IN KENYA  
Degree: MSc  
This dissertation probes in to domestic passenger ferry safety in Kenya. It looks into past 
accidents that have occurred, their causes, impacts, investigation and if any lessons were learnt 
from them. Also, it reviews the past and current operational system in the Kenya water transport 
network by analyzing the passenger vessels, operators, regulators and all stakeholders involved. 
This analysis further focusses on sampled ferry accidents and incidents in Mombasa, Kenya. 
Passenger vessels, especially domestic passenger ferries have been utilized worldwide to 
connect islands and are considered as an efficient means of transport. They have hugely 
contributed to reduce time and distance through their operational efficiency by creating shortcuts 
between islands.  
Kenya has access to both the Indian Ocean and inland waters which include lakes, dams and 
rivers. Passenger vessels in Kenya entail ferries, boats and cruise ships calling at the country's 
main port. There has been numerous passenger vessel accidents experienced in the country due 
to various reasons. In most cases, massive losses have been experienced in these accidents.  
This research has applied an appropriate accident causation model to study ferry related 
accidents in Kenya and the effect marine casualty investigation has had thereto. It has also sought 
to address any gaps that may exist between the operators, the administration and the users. 
Human Factor Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships has been used to 
present the analysis in this study because it has the additional level of outside factors and also 
expounds on unsafe acts, organizational influences, unsafe supervision and preconditions of 
unsafe acts which are major areas in relation to the safety of ferries in Kenya. It has provided a 
better understanding of ferry safety and how the human element contributes to unsafe situations. 
The closing chapter has outlined recommendations that can help in improving ferry safety in the 
country. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Key words: Ferries, Accident Analysis, Passenger Safety, Marine Casualty Investigation  
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ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC PASSENGER FERRY 
SAFETY IN KENYA. 
1 Introduction 
This research addresses domestic passenger ferries in Kenya, their operational system, history 
of accidents and incidents, their causes and preparedness that exists currently and the effect of 
marine casualty investigations from previous marine casualties. Analysis on passenger ferry 
safety has been done using the HFACS-MSS taxonomy to probe into accident causations and 
explore guidance on how to eventually achieve passenger ferry safety in Kenya. Human factor 
analysis is a multi-disciplinary science that addresses the cognitive and physical behavior of 
person(s) and how they function in social, technical and environmental situations. It may involve 
the primary operating personnel, deficiencies in management, policies, supervision, maintenance, 
and hardware and equipment design (Cushing, 2013). Due to the challenges and constraints of 
marine casualty and incident investigations in Kenya, the author has proposed countermeasures 
fixated on endowing an independent investigation body in the country whereby marine causalities 
and incidents can be efficiently and adequately investigated for the benefit of the nation and IMO 
objectives on marine casualty investigations. 
Marine casualties refer to the operation of a marine vessel that results into a loss of life, injury or 
loss of persons, damage to vessel or to the marine environment, loss of vessel or its 
abandonment, grounding or collision. On the other hand, marine incident refers to a series of 
events related to the safety of a vessel that occurs and may endanger the safety of a vessel, 
persons and environment if not corrected. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Even though water transport is ranked among the safest means of transportation in comparison 
to road transport, the safety and use of domestic passenger ferries in developing nations still 
needs more improvement (Galic, Lucik, & Skoko, 2014). Most developing countries face the 
problem of passenger ferry safety and Kenya is not exceptional as observed from the frequency 
of recent domestic ferry mishaps.  
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In every passenger transport operation, passenger safety is an essential element to be observed 
and maintained. Reports and every data pertaining passenger safety, including past accidents, 
their full analysis and stipulated recommendations require attention. Sklet (2004) highlighted that 
major accidents that lead to a higher number of fatalities still exist even though there has been 
more focus in risk assessment in the maritime industry globally. Further he suggested that if 
thorough marine casualty investigations could be conducted after every incident, many persons 
in the industry would learn and this could further help in averting future accidents. The various 
models of accident investigations applied today should be sustainable in order to ensure that the 
past mistakes in the ferry industry that have costed lives are not repeated. For a comprehensive 
investigation, a marine casualty investigation requires a combination of more than one method 
(Sklet, 2004). 
According to Schröder (2003) a solid database for marine casualties is lacking in a majority of 
developing countries which could help in performing risk assessments for the shipping industry. 
In developing nations, once a ferry accident occurs, a few unsustainable measures are taken and 
a plain investigation and recommendation is given. (Fatoumatta, 2015). Seldom will a simple 
judgement by an expert be utilized if there is no history of marine casualty data. This calls for the 
need to have knowledge about what can be done to overcome the deficiencies facing marine 
casualty investigations. In addition, Schröder (2003), and Fatoumatta, (2015) pointed out that it 
is the mandate of the investigation body that determines the focus of an investigation and as such 
the model to be used during the investigation.  
When ferry accidents occur in developing nations, the poor people are affected most because it 
is the majority who use the ferries and boats. Limited preventive measures have been put in place 
to act as measures against these accidents which are recurring. The sector seems to fall into a 
vicious cycle because of the very many sub-standard vessels operating in the public and private 
sectors. Improvement of the passenger ferry sector needs to be prioritized in terms of design, 
construction, survey, investigation, competence, just to mention but a few, in order to make the 
ferry sector safe in the country. A look at the ever overcrowded vessels at the Likoni Channel 
sends signals of a looming disaster in waiting. One can ask, what is the maritime administration 
doing about it? A probe on what policies they have formulated in this regard and the regulations 
enforced is necessary. According to Lawson et al. (2005), technology, standards and procedures 
of inspection, certification, Search and Rescue (SAR) services, training, reporting and analysis, 
and even more important the involvement of both the private and public sectors can contribute 
towards continuous improvement. 
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Varying standards, regulations and policies on professional marine casualty investigation, as well 
as different methods of assessing the investigators proficiency and competence, result in an 
inconsistent system for safe operations in the marine transport industry (Galic et al., 2014). 
Therefore with this in mind, the safety of ferries in Kenya cannot be ignored. Although the IMO is 
not responsible for such kinds of ships, they are of importance for any multi-modal transport 
system and play a vital role in contributing to a nation’s growth within a global economy. Due to 
these difficulties, this study will hence analyse the impact of passenger vessel safety with view 
from the ship-owners and the services they provide, the maritime administrations regulation 
capability and its accident investigation quality. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
The safety of maritime transportation is an establishment reliant on measures considered to have 
the capacity to protect human life, materials and non-material property affiliated directly or 
indirectly to marine transport.  Safety at sea is a fundamental component that can be broken down 
into to the following; institutions bringing legal regulations, those in charge of the implementing 
and overseeing safety measures and standards, legal instruments related to safety at sea and 
international maritime conventions, and users at sea (Galic et al., 2014). 
Accidents involving passenger ferries are common in coastal and inland navigation especially 
when necessary maritime safety regulations are not stringently followed and monitored. On the 
other hand, domestic passenger ferries are deemed to be one of the most successful types of 
transportation operating today with its commercial demand proving its stakeholders and 
consumers to be reliant on it in terms of affordable transport of trade and passengers between 
islands, (Hannah, 2016). According to Hannah, the use of domestic passenger ferries has been 
utilized worldwide as it has connected islands and its operational efficiency contributed to 
reducing the distance and operation time by creating shortcuts between these islands. In Kenya, 
the same case applies, indeed, statistics indicate that many persons use passenger vessels to 
move from one mainland to the island and back. For instance, in Mombasa, from the island 
crossing to the Likoni mainland, seven ferries with an approximate carrying capacity of 1500 
passengers operate on the channel throughout the year (KFS, 2016). However, while the capacity 
is about 1500, the ferries usually carry more than the required capacity due to the limited number 
of ferries and increase in population, thereby ignoring and violating safety the rules and 
regulations. This is also observed in other water transport areas like Lamu and inland water bodies 
like Lake Victoria, Turkana and Baringo. 
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The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA), is a government parastatal that was set up in June 2004 
with a mandate to regulate and oversee maritime affairs in Kenya's maritime industry. Promoting 
maritime safety is one of the administrations core functions.  Being the pacesetter of the industry, 
the authority has made an effort to strengthen national maritime legislation through enhancing the 
regulation and institutional capacities for safety and security of the domestic fleet. This has 
created the effective implementation of international maritime conventions and other necessary 
instruments on safety and security into the national law for the safety of domestic ships. The 
maritime administration, among other functions, coordinates search and rescue, promotes the 
preservation of the marine environment, prevents marine pollution, trade facilitation and maritime 
investments and supports maritime education and training (KMA, 2008). 
1.3 Objectives 
Following the background information mentioned above, this dissertation attempts to probe into 
ferry accidents in Kenya. In addition to having a more specified goal, this dissertation will analyse 
the causes of ferry accidents and their impacts, and identify the gaps existing in marine casualty 
investigation as well as the mitigation of these accidents including, but not limited to the following 
topics: 
1. To analyse passenger ferry accidents in Kenya by using an accident analysis taxonomy, 
Human Factors Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships (HFACS-
MSS) 
2. To identify and rank causes of accidents and incidents involving ferries. 
3. To ascertain the current situation of marine casualty and accident investigation in Kenya. 
4. To comprehend the marine casualties involved in passenger ferries, the related 
challenges and limitations aiming to identify key areas for improvement and provide 
specific practical recommendations.  
1.4 Scope and Research Methodology 
This dissertation does not endeavour to showcase all the information and issues involving ferry 
operations and safety in Kenya. The scope of this dissertation focuses on analysing some 
selected typical accidents as they have previously occurred in Kenya using the HFACS – MSS 
framework and taxonomy and probe into the marine casualty and accident investigations in the 
country. The rationale behind the use of ferries as a category of passenger vessels is due to the 
potential hazards facing the ferry transport industry in Kenya and to use them as a case in point 
which can be utilized to learn and to reference future incidents and accidents within Kenyan 
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waters. In addition to the scope, this dissertation will also analyse any existing gaps in marine 
casualty and incident investigations especially in relation to previous marine casualties for future 
prevention of similar tragedies. 
The main source of information for this dissertation includes the safety regulations for domestic 
passenger ferries, the Merchant Shipping Bill (MSB), scientific literature, journals, conference 
proceedings, professional research reports, field studies carried out in various countries, other 
dissertations, causality reports and articles and where need be, newspaper reports. Put together, 
this will demonstrate a comparative picture of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats of the ferry transport industry in Kenya. Besides, lectures from both visiting experts and 
resident professors contribute to a major extent towards this write up. 
1.5 Significance 
This study is significant because it focuses on the vital role of transportation which is important 
for the development of any nation. It cuts across the board in Kenya to address the administration, 
the seafarers, operators, future researchers and academics, policy makers, stakeholders and the 
general public. It seeks to highlight any inefficiencies in the ferry sector and suggests measures 
to bring down the negative implications through marine casualty investigations. It is assumed the 
research will guide policy makers in decision making concerning the safety of passenger vessels 
in the country. It will form an empirical and theoretical framework for further research and 
contribute towards knowledge in the subject area thereby filling some gaps in the maritime 
literature in Kenya. The public may be enlightened on various causes of marine accidents and 
the various marine casualties before, while the stakeholders and operators can look at this 
research as a document to review their roles and mandates. Lastly, but rather important, the 
recommendations and conclusion will provide new dimensions for safer performance in the ferry 
sector in Kenya. 
1.6 Structure of the study 
Based on the problems in the domestic ferry sector in Kenya briefly introduced above the thesis 
should be structured as follows: -  
Chapter I is an introduction to briefly highlight the subject matter, followed by the problem 
statement, the motivation behind this research, the objectives intended to be achieved and the 
scope and methodology used. Chapter II highlights the literature review on passenger vessel 
operations and casualties in Kenya and also looks into the national legal and regulatory 
framework and what the nation is doing to promote safety in the ferry industry. In Chapter III the 
 6 
methodology to be used is explained while in Chapter IV an analysis of data has been presented 
followed by a discussion of the analysis in Chapter V. A summary is given and the conclusions 
are stated in Chapter VI and finally the recommendations are proposed in Chapter VII. 
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2 Passenger vessel operations in Kenya. 
Every country, both developed and developing, struggles to improve its economy. Kenya is a 
nation where water transport, being an important means of connectivity both internationally and 
locally, remains to be a very vital means of transport. Various passenger vessels allow for the 
movement of people within the country and overseas. Internationally, cruise ships and large 
vessels are used to facilitate movement. The port currently has two dedicated passenger berths 
for cruise vessels calling at Kenya (WPS, 2015-2016). Cruise ships call at the Port of Mombasa, 
mostly ferrying tourists to the country, for economic advancement. According to Interferry (2017), 
a ferry can be defined as any vessel used to transport passengers and/or vehicles on water in a 
definite route in a frequent and regular basis and can range from small boats to large sea-going 
ships.  
Locally, domestic passenger ferries, speed boats and medium boats are being used. In the inland 
waters, boats are used to ferry passengers. In the coastal region largely served by the Indian 
Ocean and rivers, speed boats, boats and domestic ferries are the main passenger vessels. 
Hannah (2016), notes that domestic passenger ferries contribute towards the nation’s economy 
through transport more so when the geographical nature of the country dictates for multimodal 
approach to connectivity for business and services to be carried out in order to move goods and 
people. Ferries, being the least expensive in the hierarchy of multi-modal transport, make their 
demand to be high if they are an option in comparison to other transport means. This chapter 
presents further general information about ferry operations, accidents and a description of their 
causes and impacts. 
Domestic passenger ferries in Mombasa are a huge constituent out of all the water transportation 
systems. They offer free movement of people between the islands and mainland. They are more 
favorable considering the distance passengers could use by road to access the Island making 
them the most efficient means of transport. These ferries are regulated by the state and the legal 
regulations applying to their operation like construction, registration, operating routes, manning 
and all equally relevant legal requirements. More precisely, a “domestic passenger ferry” is 
defined to be a vessel on a scheduled route of regular operations that is entitled to transport 
passengers in accordance with the schedule (Hannah, 2016). It is a vessel that operates 
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exclusively in national waters of a member state and therefore not governed by international 
instruments of the IMO. It is therefore up to the national administration in a member state to define 
the standards of the design, equipment, maintenance and operation of these ships. This has 
created challenges in a number of IMO states in particular developing countries which are lacking 
maritime expertise and a shortage of resources in general. 
There are several institutions set up in all these places to govern the domestic ferries with the 
main aim of ensuring that ferry accidents do not occur in order to ensure passenger safety. The 
Sub-Committee on Radio Communications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR), at its seventh 
session (13 to 17 January 2003), agreed on guidance for MRO’s prepared by the joint ICAO/IMO 
working group on harmonization of aeronautical and maritime SAR at its ninth session to assist 
member governments in preparing for, and coordinating aspects of major incidents involving 
passenger vessel accidents and the rescue of large numbers of persons in distress from vessels 
and in working with companies that operate large passenger ships and aircraft to ensure that they 
are prepared to effectively support such rescue efforts (IMO, 2003). However, only moderate 
progress has been achieved and many accidents on domestic ferries are still reported in many 
countries. 
Similarly, SOLAS 74, Chapter I, Regulation 21 requires all IMO member states that are party to 
the convention to undertake and conduct investigation into any casualty occurring to its vessels 
when it judges that the investigation may assist in bringing changes to the present regulations 
and supply with the pertinent findings of the investigations. As per the IMO MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.4 
a report is required so that the final version of the marine safety investigation together with 
particular marine casualty data is prepared and entered into the Global Integrated Shipping 
Information System (GISIS) for the marine casualties and incidents module (Fatoumatta, 2015).  
The same is stipulated in Article 23 of the Load line convention. The MARPOL 73/78 convention 
in Articles 8 and 12 also probes into supplying IMO with relevant information if the vessel causes 
an effect on the marine environment. The STCW 78, as amended, requires reports of any 
incompetency or act of omission that may cause threat to life or property at sea. However, these 
requirements only apply to ships covered by the international instruments of the IMO. Domestic 
ferries as explained above, do not fall into this category. As a result, valuable information on the 
safety risks involved in the operation of these ships may not be available to an extent as this 
would be desirable in view of the relatively high accident numbers in many IMO member states. 
However, with the maritime administration in place, it easier to incorporate into the national law 
similar regulations for the domestic fleet.  
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Kenya in performing its flag and port state obligations and as an IMO member state that has 
ratified these conventions, is required to conduct casualty investigations and supply IMO with the 
findings on accidents involving its fleet. The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA), as the maritime 
administrator since June 2006, needs to incorporate a mass rescue plan into the existing national 
SAR plan and also develop a passenger ship safety plan as per the IMO requirements. This can 
be cascaded down to the domestic ferries which are not covered by these requirements. 
KMA was established through an act of parliament, KMA Act 2006. This Act gives KMA among 
other functions undertaking and coordinating research, investigations and survey in the maritime 
industry in Kenya (Kenya Gazette, 2006). Therefore, the organization is mandated to oversee the 
safety and security functions in Kenya’s Search and Rescue Region (SRR), where among others 
passenger ferries operate. The Authority has role to coordinate other relevant entities in case of 
an accident or incident involving passenger vessels. Moreover, the Kenya Ferry Service (KFS) 
was formed to oversee all ferry operations. They are mandated to ensure passenger safety in the 
ferries, maintenance of these ferries, and sensitization to passengers on all aspects involved in 
passenger ferries including accident preparedness and rescue operations. Thus the gap on mass 
rescue capability in Kenya exists and therefore this research also addresses this problem. 
2.1 The Kenya Ferry Services 
KFS is a government company that was established through the Kenya law of Companies Act 
(CAP 486) and operated under the Transport and Infrastructure Ministry for the purpose of 
operating the state ferries. The company’s headquarters operate from Mombasa. According to 
the history available at KFS, the Likoni channel ferry services in Mombasa began in 1937. To 
date, the ferries remain operational and create the only link to the southern part of the Kenyan 
coast. Being situated at the entrance into the Kilindini harbour, their operations remain of utmost 
importance as a link that serves not only locals heading to the south coast but also commuters 
traversing to Tanzania and beyond.  
Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) was bestowed responsibility by the Government, of running the ferry 
services with its operations beginning on 1st November 1989. Following that, in 1990 the 
government bought four new ferries namely MV Kilindini, MV Nyayo, MV Harambee and MV 
Mtongwe II to supplement the existing fleet (KFS 2016).  In 1998 the government formalized the 
ownership of the Kenya Ferry Services through a National Assembly Sessional Paper No.3 of the 
same year, by transforming the contributions of both the government and KPA into equity. The 
company (KFS) is now owned 80% by the government and 20% by KPA (Kenya Gazette 1998). 
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Currently in the Likoni Channel, there are seven passenger ferries that transport passengers, 
goods and vehicles between the island and the mainland leading to South Coast. In Lamu where 
a bigger port is coming up, the only means of commuting to the surrounding islands is by use of 
passenger ferries and boats most of which are privately owned. The population of passenger 
vessels in the Lamu area is much higher than any other region in Kenya due to the reason that 
they are the major means of transport in the vast surrounding number of islands. In Lake Victoria, 
there is likewise quite a large number of passenger vessels ferrying people from either one island 
to the mainland or vice versa.  
The busiest ferry services in Kenya are offered by KFS which was commissioned by Government 
of Kenya to specifically ferry people and vehicles across the Likoni channel connecting the 
mainland and the Mombasa Island due to the capacity of passengers it handles per given day. 
Data available shows that it ferries over 300,000 pedestrians and more than 6,000 vehicles daily 
across the channel (KFS 2016). There is a trend of growth especially from passengers which is 
likely to reach 500,000 by 2019 to 2020 assuming that prevailing trends continue. Although most 
are older vessels operating in the Likoni channel, the current ferries actively operating the services 
include MF Jambo, MV Nyayo, MV Harambee, MV Kilindini, MV Likoni, MV Kwale, MV Pwani and 
MV Mvita. 
 
Figure 2-1: Passenger vessel in Likoni channel 
Source: Kenya Ferry Services 
KFS’s facilities are categorised as port facility because it runs within the approach to Kilindini 
harbour and therefore is expected to be ISPS compliant. KMA as the enforcement agency 
assesses and certifies the security plan after every four year period as per ISPS Code 
 11 
requirements. There are regular improvements to safety measures at KFS done through the 
training and upgrading of safety procedures to the public and ferry personnel. 
The ferries are equipped with fire-fighting equipment as well as lifesaving appliances. The 
operation of seven lager capacity flat-bottomed ferries guarantees stability. Major improvements 
to controls have been put in place at the Likoni passenger ferry terminus; this includes an 
improved passenger waiting bay, enhanced exits leading to the public bus terminus, enhanced 
and well-lit staircases to avoid injury and slipping, a lane for persons with disabilities at both the 
mainland and Island side, an improved passenger walking bay with measured loading control 
space, uniformed and plain clothes police patrols on board and at the passenger piers to ensure 
order, control and security (KFS 2016). 
2.2 Passenger vessel accidents history 
The first major ferry disaster to hit Kenya as a nation occurred on 19th April, 1994 when the ferry 
MV Mtongwe I, then operating at the Mombasa Island to Mtongwe in the Likoni Channel, capsized 
and sank with nearly 400 passengers on board (Daily Nation, 1994). 
 
Figure 2-2: MV Mtongwe I - 1994 
Source: Daily Nation. Copyright1994 
Out of the approximately 400 people on board, at least 270 died. About 70 people aboard survived 
by swimming ashore or clinging to the few life aids on the ferry. It took a long time for rescuers to 
arrive at the scene of the accident as SAR services in Kenya regarding marine accidents were 
not well in place and relied heavily on the rescue by the Kenya Navy. Following the accident, it 
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was reported that the vessel capacity was 300 persons, way below what it was carrying (Daily 
Nation, 1994). Even after this accident, and considering its magnitude, documented reports on 
the investigation into the cause of the accident cannot be found apart from newspaper reports.  
According to a report in the Herald (1994), MV Mtongwe I was a vessel designed with a carrying 
capacity of 300 persons but often operated with more on board and had always made it safely 
across the channel connecting the Mombasa Island and the South coast in Mtongwe Likoni area. 
On the fateful day there were many more passengers on board that needed to urgently cross over 
the channel and were taken on board. While only 40 metres away from the Mtongwe shoreline in 
the South coast, Likoni, the ferry capsized while being steered toward the mainland. A probe into 
the accident by a commission set up did not apportion the blame but later on the Kenya ferry 
services and the Kenya Ports Authority accepted liability, where an agreement was reached on 
the liability of the accident in the sense that the deceased boarded the ferry knowing that it was 
overloaded. Therefore, they were 30 percent liable and the two authorities accepted 70 percent 
liability (Daily Nation, 2003) 
After the accident, the SAR mission was very difficult. According to the Daily Nation newspaper 
(1994), the sea disaster was difficult to handle because the sunken vessel, Mtongwe 1, was partly 
buried in the sand.  
Other accidents have also occurred at the coastal waters, especially at the Likoni ferry path. The 
channel is the main entrance for all vessels entering Kilindini harbour, meanwhile ferries are the 
main means of transport, connecting the Mombasa Island to the mainland across the Indian 
Ocean. The high number of ferry associated accidents that are experienced in the channel are 
attributed to mechanical failure, grounding, man overboard, and rough weather related incidents 
and rarely there can occur collisions. Other accidents that have occurred in the recent past include 
vehicle overboard or vehicle losing control while descending the ramps and ended up in the sea 
or some of the ferries overshooting the ramps. To monitor safety in the channel, a VTS service is 
offered by the KPA to ensure all vessels are safe. 
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Figure 2-3: Passenger stranded at sea in Likoni Channel 
Source: Daily Nation. Copyright 2008 
These was a near disaster at the Likoni Channel when the vessel developed mechanical problems 
and was pushed by strong winds towards the deep sea. Anxious commuters were waiting to cross 
the Indian Ocean at Likoni after the ferry was secured by another ferry and supported towards 
the landing pier after it experienced a mechanical problem with over 1000 passengers in 2008. 
 
Figure 2-4: Passenger vessel MV Nyayo being rescued by tug boat at Likoni - 2015 
Source: East Africa Standard Newspaper Copyright 2015 
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On 17th May 2015 the passenger ferry MV Kwale ran aground on a coral rock and veered off its 
course while transporting passengers across the Likoni channel. According to records from the 
KFS, some passengers were hurt due to commotion during the mishap and most panicked forcing 
them to jump off the ferry so that they could swim to the shore. The ferry at the time of the accident 
was approximated to be carrying about one thousand passengers. It drifted for about one 
kilometer from the position it hit the coral rock. Officers drawn from the KMA, KFS, Kenya Navy 
(KN), Kenya Maritime Police and volunteer organizations helped in the rescue exercise and to 
secure the vessel (The EAS 2015). 
The rescue exercise took about four hours to rescue all the passengers by another ferry MV 
Kilindini of similar capacity that took in most of the panic stricken passengers. The report further 
indicated that by the time of rescue the passengers were wearing safety life jackets. Several other 
vessels from the KN and other rescue boats from rescue partner agencies participated in the 
rescue as tasked by the Search Mission Coordinator (SMC) at the RMRCC Mombasa.  
2.3 Factors contributing to Ferry Accidents 
IMO (1997) identified some particular areas of concern that contributes towards ferry accidents. 
In general, the following factors are common to domestic ferry accidents. 
2.3.1 Faulty Design and Construction of Vessels 
The root to a safe vessel begins at the design stage. Hull form, superstructure, propulsion system 
and machinery for stability are all vital elements for a safe vessel. Construction has in most cases 
been found the cause of an accident. According to Sakalayen, (2006) some professional forward 
idea of modification in the IMO criteria developed for SOLAS vessels. He however reiterates that 
this idea seems intended to reduce construction cost but leads to sub-standard vessels. The 
vessels hull should be divided into several separate and water tight holds to keep the vessel a 
float longer to allow enough time for evacuation (Hannah, 2016). Water tight hatch covers should 
be considered as well as automatic steering gears since manual tends to fail quite often in bad 
weather. 
2.3.2 Overloading and overcrowding 
Even though the carrying capacity of a ferry is known, overloading is still done by responsible 
operators despite knowing that they are violating the rules. As long as the regulators continue to 
fail preventing the operators against carrying passengers and cargo in excess, more accidents 
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will still occur. Currently, various technologies that can count individuals exist. Staff can be 
informed when the number of individuals who have boarded a vessel has reached the maximum 
level. The system uses the concept applied in elevators but may not take into account infants and 
hand-held cargo. This weigh sensing device can overcome overloading hurdle by triggering an 
alarm when the maximum level is attained and could prevent the vessel from sailing whilst with 
an extra load (Rahman & Rosli, 2014). 
2.3.3 Maintenance 
Passenger vessels may have undetected defects obtained either during their construction or wear 
and tear. In addition, the physical aging of vessels may cause accidents. These factors are very 
common in the Kenyan passenger vessels. Many of the boats and ferries used in passenger 
movement are old and have many defects. Ferries that carry passengers across the Likoni 
channel have experienced numerous mechanical issues in the past. It has been even riskier when 
they have experienced these problems while ferrying the passengers. The detailed analysis of 
some of the incidents are as a result of a power failure, passengers concentrating on one side 
and trucks getting in the ferry losing control and hitting ferry rails among others. 
2.3.4 Crew Competence 
Knowledge, experience and training by the crew plays a significant role in the vessel safety. 
Formal training facilities are minimal in developing countries and very expensive for that case. 
Therefore, to have a competent work force at times requires the employer to initiate and sponsor 
most of the training required. Employee turnover has also contributed to losing qualified crew to 
other nations leaving very few trained crew members to man and operate the vessels locally.  
2.3.5 Inadequate regulations and enforcement 
The failure of regulatory bodies and organizations to continuously monitor the integrity and 
accuracy of their regulations and policies can lead to an unsafe regime of passenger vessel 
operations. Continuous monitoring, updating, evaluating and implementation of the amended 
international regulations into the national regimen will lead to a safety culture and compliance by 
the vessel operators. 
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2.3.6 Weather 
Unsafe weather conditions, rough seas and storms when travelling by water always pose 
unavoidable risks. Improving weather information systems and simultaneously making them more 
affordable even to small passenger vessel owners in the industry could prevent accidents and 
save thousands of lives (Golden & Weisbrod, 2016). On the other hand a culture of timely caution, 
safety concern and strong regulation may prevent accidents that can occur due to bad weather.  
2.3.7 Stability 
According to Sakalayen (2006), overcrowding by passengers on the upper deck tends to reduce 
the meta-centric height which puts the vessel in a risky situation similarly, cargo that has not been 
professionally stashed has been observed to create an unstable condition. In bad weather, if a 
vessel is not stable it is likely to list and eventually capsize.   
2.3.8 Low freeboards 
Passenger RO-RO vessels are designed in such a way that their cargo access doors are low and 
close to the waterline in order to make it easy to load and unload vehicles into the ferries. (IMO, 
1997). If the vessel stability is affected and lists it is most likely to ingress water due to the access 
threshold being below the waterline. 
In addition, Lawson & Weisbrod (2005) examined a probable way to establish safety concern in 
ferry operations in developing nations. They looked at the aspect of preventing and responding 
by concentrating on vessel design, regulatory approach and sufficiency, and also analyzed post 
event culpabilities for ferry safety. 
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Table 2-1 Areas of inquiry and prevention function for ferry safety in developing nations. 
Source: (Hannah 2016, Lawson & Weisbrod, 2005) 
According to Lawson and Weisbrod (2005), for the economic development of many countries, 
ferry transport is a significant element because of their principal dependence on them as a means 
of transportation for their cargo and passengers. They are a catalyst for the nation’s economic 
growth and for job creation. Lawson and Weisbrod (2005) also wrote that ferry transport still 
remains imperative to those local communities that highly depend on it even if there were high 
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rates of fatalities. Knowing the importance of ferry transport to the communities that use it in 
Kenya as their basis for economic development it is demoralizing both economically and socially 
due to their safety. Indications from previous accident experiences point out to various factors 
that highly contribute to towards their occurrence which include poor maintenance, incompetent 
crew capacity and outdated technology for on-board emergency response during distress 
emergencies and therefore contributing to a high number of causalities. In addition, a lack of a 
mass rescue plan, enough rescue facilities and other shore based emergency response increases 
the severity of the consequences thus increasing the number of fatalities. According to TAIC 
(2010), there is a need for significant shore-based influence for overall safety on passenger 
vessels consequently, safety regulations and the proper maintenance of vessels have been found 
to contribute highly towards the safety of passenger vessels. Dalziel et al (2012) identified in their 
research repeated causes in ferry casualties as inadequate maintenance and vessel design, 
overloading, human error, poor communication, bad weather and unavailable or delayed rescue 
response. Poor policies have been stipulated thus compromising passenger vessel safety. Also, 
the manner in which the whole operation is carried out, both by parties involved directly and 
otherwise, does not guarantee passenger vessel safety.  
2.4 External factors 
External factors may cause accidents. These factors may either be beyond human control or 
otherwise. These include: Bad weather, outdated and inaccurate navigational information, heavy 
traffic in port among others. For vessels operating on short distances and on high traffic routes 
like the Likoni ferries, ship collision risk seems to be high. Other potential causes are lack of 
adherence to the IMO requirement that passenger vessels carrying more than twelve persons on 
international routes to comply with the IMO applicable provisions. A collision of a passenger ferry 
and other small boats doing fishing within the port area or passenger vessel route is a likely factor 
in busy channels. 
2.5 Regulations derived from Very serious Casualties 
Almost all regulations for passenger vessel transport are derived from accidents, incidents and 
near misses. The Herald of Free Enterprise accident, for example, attributed to the development 
of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code while the Titanic led to the development of 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention. Nurwahyudy (2014) notes that shipping regulations 
include technical design, the construction, operations, repair, training, manning standards, regular 
inspections, security and environment impact through the vessels life span. Thorough and 
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adequate inspections should examine in depth the vessels hull condition, performance of the 
propulsion system, stability information, electrical system onboard and other machinery, fire-
fighting and prevention systems, lifesaving appliances and their arrangement, communication and 
navigation system (Interferry, 2014). 
To enhance maritime safety and marine environment protection, many counter-measures have 
been derived from marine disasters. Investigations into marine disasters have led to major 
international conventions as illustrated in the table below. 
 
Table 2-2: Regulations derived from very serious casualties 
Year Ships name Organ Measures 
1912 Titanic UN, IMO SOLAS 1929 
1965 SS Yarmouth Castle IMO SOLAS – Fire and safety amendments (non-
combustible material) 
1967 Torrey Canyon IMO Intervention Convention 1969 
MARPOL1973, CLC, 1969 
1976 Argo Merchant IMO MARPOL 1973 – Protocol of 1978 
1977 Tanker Accidents IMO SOLAS 1974 – Protocol of 1978 
1978 Amoco Cadiz IMO SOLAS 1974 – Protocol of 1978 (Introduction of the 
remote steering gear) 
1982 European Gateway IMO SOLAS 1988 – SOLAS 90 stability standards 
1987 Herald of Free 
Enterprises 
IMO ISM CODE 1994, SOLAS 1988 amendments, 
SOLAS 1988 – SOLAS 90 stability standards 
1988 Scandinavian Star IMO SOLAS 1989 amendments (fire protection) 
1990s* Bulker accidents  SOLAS Chapter XII, adopted 1997 
1989 Exxon Valdez IMO OPRC 1990, MARPOL 1992 amendments (Double 
hull) 
USA OPA 1990 
1994 Estonia IMO SOLAS 1995 amendments 
SAR Convention 1998 amendments 
1999 Erika IMO Follow up in MSC and MEPC 
EU “Erika” Package 
2002 Prestige EU EUR – OPA 
2012 Costa Concordia IMO SOLAS Chapter III – Passenger muster requirement 
 
Source: Author, Li (2006) as adopted. 
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Typical passenger ships that engage in international voyages must fully comply with the 
international regulations like SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW and UNCLOS just to mention. This is 
limited to domestic passenger ferries because they operate as coastal and inter-island vessels, 
hence are regulated by the State but it does not prevent the owners and operators from applying 
the national regulations. States are urged to review and update their national regulations in 
relation to passenger vessels and enforce them to encourage the prevention of loss of life, 
property and environment damage from ferry related casualties and incidents (IMO, 2015). 
2.6 The Legal and Regulatory framework in Kenya 
For a competent administration to conduct marine casualty and incident investigations in a 
compulsory and legal way, there is a need for regulatory and legal framework to be put in place 
to facilitate the same. Further, there is a need to separate maritime casualty investigation from all 
the other administrative duties and create an independent body to specifically conduct 
investigations. The legal framework in Kenya consists of both national legislation and international 
instruments. The Marine casualty investigation currently as stipulated in the KMA Act, shall be 
conducted by KMA. This means that the same institution that does the inspections and surveys, 
ends up conducting the casualty investigations.  
The IMO in its Resolution A.884 (21) imposes a duty on flag States to conduct marine casualty 
investigations. Domestic ferries do not fall under the category referred to in this resolution. A State 
is therefore supposed to have a national legal framework that may also be similar to the IMO 
requirements regarding its domestic fleet. Most developing nations are still struggling to do this, 
and Kenya has taken a step further by adopting the code and enforcing it through the Kenya 
Maritime Authority as per the provisions in the Merchant Shipping Act, 2009. However, the 
regulations are yet to be developed on how to conduct casualty investigations on the domestic 
fleet. 
Accordingly, the Kenya Merchant Shipping Act (2012) stipulates that when a casualty occurs, the 
loss of vessel, life or any damage caused by a vessel a preliminary inquiry into the cause of the 
casualty shall be conducted by an appointed person with powers as those conferred on an 
inspector by section 411. Further, a formal investigation shall be held by a board specifically 
appointed for that inquiry as appointed by the minister and such persons appointed to carry the 
assessment shall have requisite skills and knowledge in maritime matters. 
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2.7 Statistical Representation of Ferry Accidents in Kenya 
Different sources were able to help in achieving statistics on ferry accidents. KMA was one main 
source of acquiring the statistics considering its role in surveying, certification, registration, 
training and inspection. Also, other reports were acquired from the KFS and KPA safety sections. 
All the reports were consolidated as shown in Appendix I. 
Ferry transport can be threatened by many unforeseen events that include and not limited to 
grounding, technical failure or collisions (Łozowicka & Kaup, 2015). Common to the ferries in 
Kenya is technical failure, followed by groundings and rough weather. Least likely to be included 
are, sinking and flooding although they are the most catastrophic in their consequences. 
According to the reports filed, the main cause of accidents in ferries is mechanical failure followed 
by overloading then rough weather. Most accidents have occurred during rough weather between 
the months of April to September and are mostly contributed to by the poor stability of the vessel.  
 
 
Figure 2-5: Graph showing causes of ferry accidents in Kenya for the period 2006-2016. 
Source: Author 
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3 Methodology 
The investigation of everyday accidents and safety related incidents in order to ensure appropriate 
passenger safety assessment is very important. Water transport being as important to the nation’s 
economy, passenger ferry safety remains vital and should be efficiently and effectively executed. 
In fact, several studies have recommended efficiency in accident investigations and mitigation 
analysis. However, the high rate of accidents and fatalities is expected due to the high 
dependence on passenger ferries in Kenya. This fact is linked by various factors like; purchasing 
of old, substandard, and/or inappropriate vessels, congestion, insufficient preparation, and abrupt 
perilous weather changes. Any serious attempt to decrease the number and fatality count of ferry 
accidents in the developing world must have a complete record of past incidents on which to draw 
lessons from (Abigail et Al, 2016). In fact, several studies have recommended efficiency in 
accidents and mitigation analysis.  
According to Schröder (2004), if all the day-to-day accident-related data were to be analyzed 
rather than waiting for an accident to happen, the passenger ferry industry would benefit more, 
and the operations of safety would be more enhanced. Passenger ferry accident analysis, 
especially causation, is highly complex and must be understood adequately to improve accident 
prevention. 
It is necessary to assess accidents, their causes and ways to avoid them. In a proactive sense, 
situational awareness of accident occurrence is beneficial so as to identify the causes and failures 
associated with them in order to take a timely action.  (Heinrich et al, 1980). Reason (1990), 
introduced the multi-causality of accidents in 1990, whereby according to him, the accident 
causation mechanism is a reciprocation of active and latent failures. For this reciprocation to be 
avoided, it is essential for top management to be proactively involved. Failures may be readily 
noticeable or vice versa. The immediate causes that are observable and quickly distinguished in 
an accident are the active failures. Contrary, latent failures can exist in the system for quite a long 
period of time before the active failures can reveal them. Hidden within the organization they are 
difficult to detect, and examples include poor design, supervision gaps and lack of training. 
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(Katsakiori et al., 2009). Those quickly noticed can be dealt with sooner than later, whereas the 
rest can take time and cause more damage.  
3.1 Assessment of sources and model 
Information in the data set of this research is drawn from the accident investigation reports as 
provided by the KFS, KPA, and KMA. In addition, where official data was not available, well-
represented news sources around the world, were considered. Although most of the reports were 
available, there were some necessary elements still missing in the entries of some reports. This 
is a perfect illustration of how incomplete reporting is done not only on passenger vessel 
accidents, but also other accidents. According to Hannah (2016), this mirrors the incomplete 
reporting of ferry accidents, complex and multilayered accident causes and lack of careful 
accident investigation considering that an independent accident investigation body was missing. 
Furthermore, the missing entries and lack of proper accounts regarding passenger vessel 
accidents can be considered as the poor record keeping of accident reports. This truncated quality 
of accident investigation may be indicative of lessons not learnt from previous accidents.  
All accidents obtained as data from the above named three organizations were recorded as 
shown in appendix I, they included those that resulted in no casualties, deaths of one or more 
passengers and/or crewmembers and those that resulted to no deaths but other impacts were 
recorded. Each accident entry includes; date, name of vessel(s) involved, flag, location of the 
accident, where available: number of fatalities compared to total passenger involved, the 
proximate cause, and any exacerbating factors. Other factors that were available on the reports 
but not included in the appendix include their operators or owners; weather conditions; captain 
and crew member response; and the timing and effectiveness of search and rescue efforts, if any 
was carried out. However, latter factors were inadvertently considered in the selected accident 
cases whose reports are used for analysis.  
In many developing countries for example Kenya, where ferries are a major transport means for 
many, minor passenger ferry accidents are common as well as major delays and major accidents 
once in a while. In this case either accident investigations are not carried out or their results are 
never published. If we get the full-length detailed investigation reports for all, or even most, of the 
cases described in this dissertation, the analysis of passenger ferry accidents, as illustrated 
below, would be valuable. With comprehensive reports, we would easily thoroughly outline the 
interacting technical, organizational, and human factors leading to fatal passenger ferry accidents 
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through various models such as SEMOMAP, as put in practice by Nurwahyudy (2014) to 
determine the causes and contributing factors of selected ferry accidents.  
3.2 Marine Casualty Investigation 
To continually improve and maintain safety, assessing maritime accident casualties through 
investigation is an important requirement as stipulated by several IMO conventions. Maritime 
casualty investigation is a requirement of SOLAS regulation 1/21, MARPOL Article 8 and 
UNCLOS Article 94. Furthermore, IMO has adopted reasons (1990) and Rasmussen’s Taxonomy 
of Error (1987) which are part of the HFACS, SHEL and GEMS frameworks to form an integrated 
human factor framework for use in the investigation of human factors (IMO 2000). This is an 
indication of the big role that maritime casualty investigation plays for improved and safer water 
transport.    
According to UNCLOS, article 94 on duties of the flag state, paragraph 7, it is the flag states 
mandate and duty to conduct maritime casualty investigation. It states:-  
Each state shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably qualified person or 
persons into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas involving a 
ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals of another State or 
serious damage to ships or installations of another state or to the marine environment. 
The flag state and the other state shall co-operate in the conduct of any inquiry held by 
that other state into any such marine casualty or incident of navigation (United Nations, 
1982). 
In addition, IMO under SOLAS has adopted IMO Resolution MSc. 255 (84) which is a code that 
requires every very serious maritime casualty to be investigated. It requires safety investigation 
to be conducted into casualty involving death, severe environmental damage or total loss of the 
ship. The code is known as the Casualty Investigation Code, whose aim is to apply international 
standards and practices that have been recommended for a marine casualty investigation 
(Hannah, 2016). This however as explicitly explained above, only affects international sea going 
vessels and not domestic vessels. Therefore, a State is required to draft into their national law, a 
legislation that will cover an elaborate way of accident investigation and reporting of near misses 
equivalent to the international conventions above to guide in the domestic fleet accident 
investigations. This will encourage safety practices in the industry for all domestic vessels. 
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3.3 Models of accident Causation 
Accident investigation is useful in that it helps one to comprehend the entire process, from how 
the accident happens to what should be done to prevent it. It should be able to make an 
assumption of how the accident happened and if it was possible to be prevented by considering 
some measures that can counter the contributing causal factors. Accident investigation has over 
the past century evolved with early focus on equipment or hardware failures being superseded 
by more scrutiny on an operator’s unsafe acts or human error  after which more focus was given 
to the organizational system in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Salmon, 2011). Moreover, 
accident models and their scope of investigation are often described together. However, this has 
changed over time since many accident causation models available often influence the 
investigation outcome by overlooking some things, unlike others.   
According to Hollnagel (2002), accident analysis implies an accident model. Anyanwu, (2014), 
Psarros et al (2010) further says it is a very important process that provides input for advancement 
of cost-effective and proactive regulations. An accident model is a representation of conceptual 
abstract of the development and occurrence of accident by describing thoughts of why and how 
it occurs and envisions the phenomenon (Hollnagel, 2008). Hollnagel further divided accident 
models into epidemiological, sequential and systemic and functional giving each a set of 
hypothesis on how analysis should be performed with their respective reality viewed and their 
limitations and theoretical foundations. 
3.3.1 Traditional Approaches 
There are basically two models in the traditional approaches and they include the epidemiological 
model and the event based model. 
3.3.1.1 Event/sequential based model 
Heinrich, in 1931, first introduced the Domino Model. It explains that an event occurs in a 
chronological way following a chain reaction of occurrences. He explains that multiple events 
occurring each after the other lead to an accident. By eliminating one or more of the links in the 
chain of events, an accident can be prevented and he further explains that the model is focused 
on the failure and malfunction of independent causes. It is a linear model determining causes to 
being independent of every event (Nurwahyudy, 2014). 
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Figure 3-1: Domino-model theory 
Source: Heinrich (1931) 
3.3.1.2 Epidemiological Model (Complex Linear System Models) 
This model was originally used on the biological spread of disease. In 1949, Gordon 
recommended this model to characterize accident by combining initiating events with 
environmental factors making the events outcome leading to the accident out of proportion with 
the resulting accident. The model identified that latent factors contribute to the occurrence of 
accidents. The Swiss Cheese Model is one example of the epidemiological model as Reason 
(1997) proposed due to the argumentation that it identified that the safety barrier can prevent 
latent failures from causing accidents if they are set in place. According to Hollnagel (2002), the 
epidemiological model for analyzing accidents can be described as the outcome of combined 
factors that are hardly strong and difficult to specify in depth.  
This model avoids bias potential and may lead to an investigation report that describes an 
accident event completely but it is deficient in two respects; first, it needs an efficient and 
theoretically supported scheme for classification of accidents and secondly it needs guidance 
from a theory of accidents (Harvey, 1985). 
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3.3.2 Modern Approach/Systemic Models 
These are models that adopt non-linear model concepts developed due to known insufficiencies 
in the traditional approach. The models view accidents as emanating development rising because 
of the complex synergy between active and latent components that could lead to poor 
performance thereby causing an accident. According to Nurwahyudy (2014). These models 
include STAMP, CREAM and TRACEr. HFACS is also one of the system based approaches to 
accident analysis. 
3.4 Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS) Framework 
This framework for investigating and analyzing human error was a theoretical based mechanism 
affiliated to incidents and accidents as research indicated it could be certainly dependable in 
identifying the human factor chain of events associated with accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2007). It investigates active failures by operators including how operator decisions influence the 
occurrence of accidents in conjunction with the latent conditions in the management level of an 
organization (Celik & Cebi, 2009).  
Within Reasons’ Swiss Cheese Model, HFACS emerged from the absence of taxonomies of latent 
failures and unsafe acts, therefore it was developed and designed to supplement that gap. It is 
an independent method of establishing the contribution of human error towards an accident and 
is applied in various kinds of incidents like grounding and collision (Łozowicka & Kaup, 2015). It 
was initially designed in the United States for the investigation and analysis of operator errors in 
naval aviation incidents. Drawing from Reason’s 1990 concept, it described taxonomies for the 
failure mode at each of the four levels in the hierarchy (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2007).  
Accordingly, Celik & Cebi (2009), reiterated that the HFACS theory motivated accident 
investigators to seeking latent factors like technological environment, fatigue and physical 
environment among others increasing consistency of its mechanism for accident investigation 
practices. It can therefore be said, investigators are able to classify probable causal factors and 
errors across the taxonomies provided across the four levels. Reason (1997) proposed the "Swiss 
Cheese" accident causation model and emphasized the organizational dimension of major 
accidents. Latent conditions and failures are visibly distinguished through the Swiss cheese 
model. Errors and violations are seen as the consequences of deeper causes.  
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Undoubtedly, these are unsafe acts known as active failures committed by operators of the 
system at the “sharp end” that have an immediate and direct impact on the safety of the system. 
On the other hand, latent conditions can exist in a system for a very long time without causing 
damaging consequences. Reason (1988), compares them to resident pathogenic agents. In fact, 
they need to be combined with a local trigger element and active failures to cause an accident. 
According to Chauvin et al. (2013), latent conditions arise from the strategic and top-level 
decisions made by governments, manufacturers, regulators, designers, and organizational 
managers. 
 
Figure 3-2: Reasons Swiss Cheese model 
Source: Salmon, P. (2011) 
Made up of four tiers or levels with nineteen causal factors, the structure of HFACS is hierarchical. 
The four tiers include unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and 
organizational influences. In the hierarchy, it is assumed as factors go up by proceeding from 
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active to latent conditions starting from unsafe acts to organizational influences with each level 
being dependent on the previous one (Springer, 2016). Figure 3.3 below illustrates this. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: HFACS Hierarchy 
Source: Adapted from Shappell et al., (2007) 
3.5 Human Factor Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships (HFACS-
MSS)  
For the success of this dissertation, various accident causation models have been observed. 
However, the model chosen and used that has met the author’s preferences and requirements is 
the HFACS- MSS by considering Ghirxi’s adaptation of Weigmann & Shappell’s HFACS. The 
modified HFACS for machinery spaces on ships is illustrated in the table below as adapted by 
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Schroder-Hinrichs et al (2011) with an additional fifth level to the HFACS called outside factors 
above the organizational influences with an intention of focusing on the influence of safety 
regulations in shipping and their enforcement. This model does not intend to change the prior 
existing framework but comes with minor modification since the HFACS framework was originally 
designed for use in the aviation industry (Hannah, 2016). The primary aim for this addition is to 
cater for the effect of safety regulations in shipping and its enforcement. (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 
2011)  
Table 3-1: HFACS-MSS Framework 
 
Source: Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011) 
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3.5.1 Unsafe Acts 
These are active actions which lead to an unsafe situation or error. Unsafe acts are classified 
according to whether they are intentional or unintentional where intentional acts could be mistakes 
or violations while unintentional acts present themselves as slips due to attention lapses and 
failures as a result of memory failure (Reason, 1997). According to Reason (1990), unsafe acts 
should occur in a spatial and temporal proximity of a hazard. Relating to ferry accidents, unsafe 
acts relate to operator actions and reaction towards an existing situation on board. In this type of 
industry, it is good to identify unsafe acts from the initial step for the benefit of marine casualty 
investigation in order to trace back to management level. It’s however worth noting that several 
unsafe acts, by different operators can lead to one accident.  
 
Figure 3-4: Categorization of Unsafe acts 
Source: Ghirxi (2008)  
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3.5.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Shappell and Wiegman (2000) illustrate preconditions for unsafe acts as factors in a calamity if 
active or latent preconditions like the condition of the environment, operators, and personnel that 
affect the individuals’ practices to result to an unsafe condition or human error. Both 
environmental and individual factors are considered with individual factors covering both the 
physical condition and interaction of the human and the environment that widely touch on physical 
and technological environment factors (Ren, 2009). In the figure below, the precondition factors 
are categorized into three groups: crew condition, environmental factors, and personnel factors 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Categorization of preconditions for unsafe acts 
Source: Ghirxi (2008)  
3.5.3 Unsafe Supervision 
These are factors in a mishap affected directly by practices, conditions or actions resulting from 
decisions, methods or policies of the management chain of command from officers at managerial 
level over technical or support level resulting in human error or unsafe situation. There are four 
groups under unsafe supervision and they include inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
operations, supervisory violations and failure to correct known problems (Ren, 2009) 
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Figure 3-6: Categorization of unsafe supervision. 
Source: Ghirxi (2008)  
3.5.4 Organisational Influences 
These are factors in a mishap if the communications, omissions, policies or actions of high-level 
management affect conditions, supervisory practices or actions of crew directly or indirectly to 
result in human error, system failure or an unsafe situation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, Ren 
2009).  Under this category, four groups including organizational climate, resource management, 
organizational process and statutory are mentioned. The new category added by Ghirxi has 
international/national standards and flag state implementation as its subcategories. 
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Figure 3-7: Categorization of organizational influence. 
Source: Ghirxi (2008)  
3.6 Sample selection 
All marine casualty reports are supposed to be reported and recorded in the IMO Global 
Integrated Information System (GISIS) based on the IMO reporting requirements. This study 
however dwelt on domestic passenger vessels in Kenya only. Domestic ferry incidents and 
accidents fall under the national jurisdiction, thus their investigation reports were available only 
locally. For the review it was necessary to take a representative sample which allowed to a certain 
degree, generalized findings. The reports were complimented by the additional cases of Search 
and Rescue incidents coordinated at the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(RMRCC Mombasa) in order to ascertain the number of casualties and level of severity. The time 
range of the cases chosen was between 1990 and 2016 and the severity consequences of the 
cases are highlighted in the next chapter. 
For proper identification and classification of the human factors contained in the identified 
investigation reports proper apprehension of different factors and their relationship was necessary 
since HFACS-MSS taxonomy does not provide a tool to pinpoint the relationship or failed path 
(Ren, 2009). Therefore barrier analysis combined with a time-line was chosen to be used as the 
description tool. According to Reason 2006, the barrier concept gives model interaction 
opportunity and high risk domain complexity. It is also essential to say that the factors to be 
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analyzed have been obtained from the investigation reports while avoiding re-investigating the 
accidents that would lead to biased judgement (Ghirxi, 2008).  
3.7 Data 
Many accidents have been documented in the country and data collected dated back from 1982 
to 2016 as shown in Appendix I. Within the overview shown in the appendix, coding was not 
possible on most of the accidents because of the lack of substantial information on accident 
investigation reports or no reports at all. However, 10 accidents were obtained that occurred in 
2011 to 2017 for the analysis. One more accident involving MV Mtongwe I that occurred in 1994 
was included in the analysis because of its magnitude in the nation having been the worst 
maritime accident to this date. 
The seriousness of the reports was categorized according to IMO’s MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.1 
requirements on revised harmonized reporting procedures. Very serious casualties were 
classified as those that involved total loss of vessel, severe damage of the environment and loss 
of life. The serious casualties were classified as those that did not qualify as serious but led to 
grounding, collision, and vessel damage from bad weather but resulted to the vessel being unfit 
to proceed. Lastly the less serious were classified as those that did not qualify as a very serious 
or serious casualties but included hazardous incidents or near misses. 
In general 11 marine casualty investigation reports regarding ferries in Kenya have been analyzed 
as illustrated in the table below: -   
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Table 3-2: Summary of uncoded passenger vessel accidents 
Selected passenger vessel incidents / accidents in Mombasa – Kenya 
 
NO. DATE VESSEL 
NAME 
AREA TYPE SEVERITY REMARKS 
1 29/4/1994 Mtongwe 1 Likoni 
Channel 
Capsize Very 
Serious 
272 died, more 
than 70 rescued 
2 15/9/2011 MV. 
Kwale/Sea 
Wind 
Kilindini 
Harbour 
Contact Serious Damage 
sustained to 
both ships 
3 1/1/2012 MV. 
Safina/Al 
Intsam 
Lamu Collision Very 
serious 
Damage to both 
vessels and 
lives lost 
4 20/6/2017 MV. 
Bassaam 
Lamu Sinking Very 
serious 
Lives lost 
5 11/11/2015 MV. Kwale Likoni 
Channel 
Grounding Serious Passengers 
evacuated 
6 26/9/2011 MV. Yusra Mukowe Stranding Serious Passengers 
injured 
7 27/7/2013 MV. Hodari Kiwayu Mechanical 
problem 
Serious No injuries 
8 9/6/2016 MV. Kilindini Likoni 
Channel 
Man and 
vehicle 
overboard 
Less 
serious 
Loss of one 
passenger 
9 25/1/2013 MV. Likoni Likoni 
Channel 
Vehicle 
lost control  
Serious Loss of lives 
10 17/9/2016 MV. Nyayo Likoni 
Channel 
Engine 
failure 
Less 
serious 
Passengers 
evacuated 
11 6/6/2016 MV. 
Harambee 
Likoni 
Channel 
Mechanical 
problem 
Less 
serious 
Persons injured 
Source: Author 
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4 Presentation of the findings from accident reports analyses 
The essential aim of this study is to present the passenger ferry accident investigation reports 
and data. This chapter presents data as reviewed and coded using the HFACS-MSS by the 
author, (See Appendix II). The coding has been further reviewed by a qualified person in 
passenger vessel accident investigation to validate or identify any deviations in the analysis. A 
total of 11 accidents are analysed. It is important to note that only causal factors that were 
explicitly mentioned in the reports have been considered and classified according to the HFACS-
MSS to avoid subjective interpretations (Chauvin, et al. 2013, Hannah, 2016). With this, no 
contributing factors have been added.  
The choice of HFACS -MSS was attributed due to the IMO’s adoption of Reason’s (1990) HFACS 
model and its guidelines on accident investigations (IMO, 1997, Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011). 
According to Li et al. (2008) the model is encouraged for the utilization in the maritime domain. 
Therefore, being a widely used framework, the author is motivated to apply it since it can easily 
be used for the kind of data available for this research. Machinery Space Systems as adopted by 
Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011 does not tamper with the original HFACS framework but it includes 
a 5th level called statutory in order to capture the enforcement and influence of safety regulations 
in the shipping industry (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011) 
For better comprehension, their severity was summarized as shown in table 4.1 below in various 
seriousness categories according to IMO’s proposed process of casualty reports analysis and 
also the causal factors coded after analyzing the sampled data of ferry accidents around the 
Mombasa region, Kenya.  
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Table 4-1: Severity of the passenger ferry accidents and coded factors 
Accident Category Number Coded causal factors from 11 reports Number 
Less serious accident 3 Unsafe acts 12 
Serious 5 Preconditions for unsafe acts 16 
Very serious accident 3 Unsafe Supervision 5 
  Organizational influence & Statutory 16 
Total 11 Total 49 
Source: Author 
The level of the undertaken analysis was not affected by how severe the ferry accident was or 
the casualty during the accident investigation. 
4.1 Utilization of HFACS-MSS Framework and Taxonomy for Accident Analysis 
The human factors captured from the presented reports were coded against Ghirxi’s adaptation 
of Weigmann & Shappell’s HFACS framework and taxonomy. From the reports outcome, it can 
be clearly noted that uncommon accidents do not occur from unique sources but rather a 
combination of familiar components as a result of unforeseen hazards and unpredictable 
conditions. Human factors identified from one incident are not likely to vary much from those in a 
different mishap of the same nature. According to Shappell & Wiegmann (2000), most mishap are 
due to similar causes and this was proved to be true during the analysis and coding of the reports. 
The aim of Ghirxi in the adaptation of the HFACS framework was to create a platform for future 
research and since their adaptation is skewed towards machinery space on ships to capture 
safety regulations in the ship industry, it can be trusted to be utilized in this analysis. 
Upon Coding the 11 accident reports (see appendix II), as presented in table 4-1 above, causal 
factors on Human Factor Analysis Classification System – Machinery Spaces on Ships were 
identified. On completing the analyzing and describing of all the accidents the realized human 
factors were manually coded using the 3rd Tier HFACS-MSS framework indicated in table 4-2 
below. 
 39 
 
Table 4-2: The identified 49 3rd tier HFACS-MSS causal factors in reviewed accident reports. 
Reported HFACS Causal Factors 
Figures 
No.  % 
Statutory 6 12.25% 
FS xxx Statutory 6 12.25% 
FS 000 International standards 2 4.08% 
FS 100 Flag state implementation 4 8.16% 
Organizational Influences 10 20.41% 
OR xxx Resource management 1 2.04% 
OR 000 Human resources 0 0.00% 
OR 100 Technological Resources 1 2.04% 
OR 200 Equipment/facility resources 0 0.00% 
OC xxx Organizational climate 8 16.33% 
OC 000 Structure 0 0.00% 
OC 100 Policies 0 0.00% 
OC 200 Culture 8 16.33% 
OP xxx Organizational Process 1 2.04% 
OP 000 Operations 0 0.00% 
OP 100 Procedures 0 0.00% 
OP 200 Oversight 1 2.04% 
Unsafe supervision/work place factors 5 10.20% 
SI xxx Inadequate supervision 3 6.12% 
SI 000 Shipborne and shore supervision 3 6.12% 
SP xxx Planned inappropriate operations 0 0.00% 
SP 000 Shipborne operations 0 0.00% 
SF xxx Failed to correct known problems 0 0.00% 
SF 000 Shipborne related shortcomings 0 0.00% 
SV xxx Supervisory violations 2 4.08% 
SV 000 Shipborne violations 2 4.08% 
Preconditions for unsafe acts 16 32.65% 
PE xxx Environmental factors 12 24.49% 
PE 000 Physical environment 5 10.20% 
PE 100 Technological environment 7 14.26% 
PC xxx Crew Condition 1 2.04% 
PC 000 Cognitive factors 1 2.04% 
PC 100 Physiological state 0 0.00% 
PP xxx Personnel factors 3 6.12% 
PP 000 Crew interaction 0 0.00% 
Pp 100 Personnel readiness 3 6.12% 
Unsafe acts 12 24.49% 
AE xxx Errors 7 14.26% 
AE 000 Skill-based errors 1 2.04% 
AE 100 Decision and judgement errors 5 10.20% 
AE 200 Perceptual errors 1 2.04% 
AV xxx Violations  5 10.20% 
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AV 000 Routine violations 4 8.16% 
AV 100 Exceptional violations 1 2.04% 
Total 49 100% 
Source: Author as adopted from Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011. 
A total of 49 causal factors deduced from the analysis of 11 ferry accidents are shown in table 4-
2 above. A clear relation between these factors could not be easily established. Some reports 
contained more elaborate investigation discussions than others even though they were of a less 
serious accident magnitude than the very serious accidents. As tabulated in the table above, the 
data shows that there was no even distribution of all the 3rd tier factors. 
The sources of the reports played a significant role as well as how deep the investigation was 
carried out and the cause of accident analysis in the reports. The most elaborate were the reports 
from the maritime administrator while those chosen from newspapers were not very elaborate 
because of the non-follow up of the accidents, and the reporting persons did not have the 
adequate technical skills to investigate the accidents but highlighted most of the causal factors as 
much as necessary.  
According to IMO requirements, the very serious investigation reports are supposed to be 
submitted to its secretariat and recorded into the GISIS system while the serious and less serious 
reports are not a requirement for submission. No report from the state was found in the IMO GISIS 
database. 
4.2 Identification of Contributing Factors. 
The reports reviewed led into the 49 3rd tier causal factors as shown in Table 4-2 above. Among 
the contributing causal factors established, preconditions of unsafe acts were leading with one 
third of all the factors followed by unsafe acts with a quarter of all the factors, organizational 
influence (20 %), statutory (12%) and the least causal factors identified were unsafe supervision 
with 10% in the 1st tier as indicated in Figure 4-1 below.  
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Figure 4-1: Overview of 1st Tier factors 
Source: Author 
4.2.1 Unsafe acts 
There were 12 identified unsafe acts 3rd tier factors from the total causal factors realised. This 
represented 24.49% of all the identified factors, slightly about one quarter of all the factors as 
illustrated by figure 4-1. Decision and judgement errors represented 41.67% of all the unsafe acts 
and were followed by routine violations which was exactly one third of all the unsafe acts identified. 
Skill-based errors, perpetual errors and exceptional violations together contributed by 25% 
towards unsafe acts with an equal number of one factor each. The review also revealed that at 
least all 3rd tier factors of unsafe acts could be identified from most of the reports but were not 
evenly distributed among the errors and violations.   
 
Unsafe acts
25%
Preconditions for 
unsafe acts
33%
Unsafe Supervision
10%
Organizational 
influence
20%
Statutory
12%
Unsafe acts Preconditions for unsafe acts Unsafe Supervision
Organizational influence Statutory
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Figure 4-2: Overview of unsafe acts 
Source: Author 
4.2.2 Preconditions of unsafe acts 
Preconditions of unsafe acts led with 16 factors having a representation of one third (32.65%) of 
the total causal factors identified. These were distributed unevenly whereby environmental factors 
had two thirds of all the preconditions and were dominated by the technological environment 
which had the highest number of factors (43.75%) while the physical environment had 31.25% of 
all the preconditions causal factors as represented in figure 4-3 below. Crew interaction and 
physiological state in the 3rd tier did not have any factors but all the 2nd tier factors had at least 
some factors. Not many causal factors were as a result of crew condition and it represented 6% 
of the preconditions identified under cognitive factors in the 3rd tier. The preconditions identified 
provided specific indication for deliberating machinery space and engine control room and how it 
affects human action leading to unsafe situation. This data can tell the maritime administrators 
and the ferry operators the extent to which technological environment factors matter in the day-
to-day ferry operations and also to training institutions on what to improve in maritime education 
and training. 
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Figure 4-3: Overview of preconditions of unsafe acts. 
Source: Author 
4.2.3 Unsafe Supervision 
This category was the most underrepresented as it was not easy to point out causal factors related 
to unsafe supervision from the reports. Out of the total number of identified factors, 10% were 
contributed by unsafe supervision. This was contributed to by shipborne and shore supervision 
where in a mishap the ships managers’ interaction with those officers at management level 
affected the everyday operation on board the ferry. This were the highest number of contributing 
human factors in the unsafe supervision category with 60% of all unsafe supervision factors while 
the remaining percentage was due to shipborne violations. Shipborne operations and shipborne 
related shortcomings did not contribute to any of the accidents.   
4.2.4 Organizational influences and Outside factors 
Ten organizational influence factors were identified in seven accident reports representing 20% 
of the total causal factors while 6 outside factors were identified in six reports. 80% the 
organizational factors, were due to culture while the remaining attributed to oversight and 
technological resources with each having 10%. Culture was the leading 3rd tier causal factor 
Physical environment
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whereby it contributed by 16.33% of all the causal factors. This is as a result of how a company’s 
custom, crew attitude and values in the work environment affect their day-to-day decisions and 
contribute to unsafe acts. In most of the reports, this is attributed to pressure from passengers 
especially those using the ferries plying the Likoni channel. The ferry schedules according to the 
ferry operators as indicated in the reports, if not handled well lead to stampedes and overloading 
rendering the ferries in to further unsafe condition. 
Outside factors arise in mishaps if the regulator lacks the necessary depth or leads a sub-standard 
regime. National standards factors were identified in 2 accident reports representing one third of 
statutory factors reflecting the drawbacks that could be in national regulations and policy 
enforcement. The remaining two thirds was identified in port state and flag state implementation. 
Outside factors contributed by 12.25% of the total identified causal factors because in domestic 
ferries there is no international control as the conventions do not affect them but rather the national 
policies and regulations. 
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5 Discussion of the accident review findings 
The results presented in the preceding chapter has been discussed with regards to the 11 
accidents analysed in this dissertation. Some of the reports were detailed while some explicitly 
lacked detail making it impossible to identify more causal factors. However, that by itself can also 
be considered as an important data source to understand how ferry accidents are handled in 
Kenya, the record keeping and the kind of investigation carried on. According to Schröder-
Hinrichs et al (2011), a look into other studies from the same domain have indicated present 
consistent causal factor structures. In comparison, by this study focusing on domestic passenger 
ferries in Kenya, it could relate to the other studies findings and it was thus easier to identify active 
failures more easily than latent failures, as was discovered in most reports. Human factors 
contributing directly to the cause of the accident, like collision and overloading, are discussed and 
also other parameters with broad factors including, but not limited to vessel non-maintenance, 
sailing in bad weather, failure to provide life-saving appliances among others.  
5.1 The unsafe acts involving crew and ferry operators 
Crew and ferry owners or operators attributed to many unsafe acts as a result of errors of 
commission like performing incorrect acts, errors of omission whereby an act is left out like the 
maintenance of ferries MV Harambee and MV Kilindini. Also, timing whereby ferries were sailing 
in very rough seas an example of MV Nyayo and Bassaam, without considering their stability. 
Errors of sequence like, overloading the MV Nyayo, not maintaining it and further letting it sail in 
very rough seas. If a system is more complex there are likely to be multiple unsafe acts due to 
errors of sequence or if acts are performed in the wrong order. For instance, the Likoni channel 
due to the area in which the ferries operate, serves as the approach to Kilindini harbour which 
has vessels entering and leaving the port. Therefore, considering the high number of passengers 
and vehicles that need to use ferries across the channel without delays, increases the complexity 
of the ferry operations. This was observed during the review of the reports when some latent 
conditions led to active failures whenever there was a small breakdown in one of the ferries or if 
there was any delay. Errors have different psychological sources, take different forms and happen 
at various sections of the system requiring diverse ways of solving them. So as to be able to know 
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who is at the sharp end of the accident, prior understanding of each step and section of the system 
by the investigator is necessary. According to Hollnagel (2008), the function of the system is more 
important than the structure in order to reduce the number of mishaps.  
If the investigation reports were to be utilized properly, the kind of multiple errors of same nature 
could not be seen recurring in different incidents. To start with, the 1994 Mtongwe I accident could 
have been used as a learning platform in avoiding the causal factors that led to the accident. The 
vessel was being overloaded on a routine basis until the accident day. Similar to what was 
reported in the report of sinking of Mtongwe I, a big percentage of ferries operating in Mombasa 
are always overloaded especially during the rush hours as discussed in the literature review. Out 
of the 11 accidents analysed, 8 of them have serious cases of overloading beyond the vessels 
capacity.  
Most unsafe factors account to Errors AE 200 – decision and judgement errors. An example is 
where MV Mtongwe I’s coxswain decided to sail with the vessel even though he noticed that it 
was overloaded, but due to the fact that he had done several voyages before with the vessel in 
similar condition, he did not think of any other underlying latent factor that could lead to the failure 
of the vessel and its further capsizing. Almost 20 years later, this is seen being repeated by MV 
Nyayo, Harambee, Kwale, Bassaam and many other ferries. Other errors include skill-based 
errors as seen during the contact between MV. Kwale and Sea Wind. Perceptual errors were also 
noted in the case of MV. Bassaam whose operator or crew lacked situational awareness on 
weather condition before voyage.  
Violations, more so routine violations, were identified for example in the Mtongwe I accident, 
which frequently overloaded the vessel especially during rush hours and also on the collision 
between Safina and Al-intsam, where Safina was overloaded and both vessels were operating at 
night without navigational lights. The captain of Bassaam who had 30 years’ experience, but did 
not have any formal professional qualifications, was also classified as a routine violation.  
5.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Most factors were identified in this category and environmental factors were the major contributing 
in most of the accidents because of machinery space, engine control room and technical 
procedures and how they affected crew performance leading to unsafe situations. Technological 
environment led among the other factors, especially the vessels operating at the Likoni channel 
due to vessel maintenance issues and machinery failure, for instance MV Nyayo and MV 
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Harambee.  The lack of navigational lights on Safina and Al-Intsam and MV Hodari operating with 
a malfunctioning engine was considered technological factors. On its own, technological 
environment contributed by 14.26% of all the 49 causal factors identified and was the second 
highest of the contributing factors. Physical environment was the second cause of many mishaps 
under environmental factors due to the effects of nature like bad weather and rough seas where 
for example, in the case of MV Kwale contact with the Sea Wind, the Coxswain of Kwale had not 
taken into consideration the currents and rising tides. The same was experienced with Bassaam 
and MV Nyayo. Operating during the night limited the physical environment of Safina and Al-
Intsam leading to an unsafe situation.  
5.3 Unsafe Supervision 
Most of the causal factors falling under this category were identified from the Mtongwe I sinking, 
Kwale and Sea wind contact, MV Nyayo and MV Harambee accidents. In the case of Mtongwe I, 
shipborne violations were identified because the ferry was overloaded on a regular basis and the 
management failed to correct the action. For MV Harambee, the management knew the vessel 
was unfit but due to the fact that two other vessels were undergoing repair, the vessel was allowed 
to operate. During the Sea wind and Kwale contact, the VTS was not monitoring vessel activities 
in the busy channel and could have alerted MV. Kwale on time before the contact. Twenty years 
after the sinking of Mtongwe I ferry, most ferries that operate the Likoni channel still operate under 
similar circumstances as depicted in the reports. 
5.4 Organizational Influences and Outside Factors 
The study revealed quite a number of organizational and outside factors. This indicated how the 
actions and policies of upper level management affect the crew actions leading to unsafe 
situations. On organisational influence, organisational climate contributed highly through culture 
on board. This was seen in several mishaps where for example overloading was done and in 
other cases is still done regularly but the management has failed to correct this known culture 
instead leaving it to lead to an unsafe situation. The lack of safety culture is seen in a number of 
vessels including Mtongwe I, Safina and Al-intsam, Bassaam whereby the captain did not have 
formal training, Hodari, MV Kilindini, MV Nyayo for allowing an unseaworthy vessel to fill in for 
other ferries and on MV Harambee which, although faulty, was allowed to operate for economic 
reasons.  
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Other organisational influences were due to oversight causal factors in the case of Nyayo where 
two other vessels were already out of order and another was technological resources in the case 
of MV Harambee that was allowed to operate while faulty because there were no funds to repair 
the defective vessel.  
Under HFACS-MSS, outside factors form their own category and for this study it was used to 
evaluate the performance of flag and port state control on domestic fleet. In most cases, there are 
no measures in place to prevent faulty ferries from operating and there is no evidence of regular 
inspections as identified on the vessel Hodari. The national standards too are compromised and 
in cases like Safina the police did not have sufficient powers to stop the overloaded vessel from 
sailing. The causal factor most identified is port and flag state implementation whereby the state’s 
inspections fail to help capture the vessels deficiencies in advance to prevent unsafe situations.  
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6 Conclusion  
The aim of this study was to analyse the factors caused by human error in the domestic ferries in 
Kenya with an aim of finding a solution on how to reduce the named factors. The study therefore 
further looked into marine casualty investigations and the status of investigations after ferries 
have had mishaps that led to casualties. 
According to IMO, up to 80% of accidents are caused by human error, however safety of domestic 
ferries in Kenya depend on a variety of factors not limited to human factors, such as bad weather, 
navigational, technical, operational and statutory factors. This analysis has found that many types 
of accidents in the country are caused by human factors. From Appendix 1 it is clear that there 
have been so many accidents occurring within a short range of time, especially from the most 
recent years. This is a period whereby it is expected that accidents are supposed to have reduced 
because the maritime administration has ratified policies and regulations to improve safety, 
allowed better and more stable vessels to operate, and learnt lessons from previous accidents. 
With the introduction of maritime education and training in local universities and colleges, it is also 
expected that the level of training among crews is now improved.  
Recurring accidents prompt one to question if the policies and regulations enforced by the 
maritime administrator were being adhered to. With the right regulations, technical standards, and 
right resources the chance of bringing down accidents due to human error are very high if the 
right people with the correct knowledge and skills run the ferry industry. Ship owners are also not 
left out since some factors pointed out from the reports indicate that they have contributed to 
some of the causes of the accidents. 
During the data collection, it was very difficult to sample reports due to quality of the report 
reflected either by incomplete accident reporting, lack of reliable accident investigations and in 
other cases complex forms of accidents or multilayered accidents. There was a very big indication 
of poor record keeping as well as poor accident investigation reports which for the few available 
were never published and here this is proposed as another human factor that is contributing to 
the lack of safety with the domestic ferries in Kenya. However, this should not be seen as a failure 
 50 
of the research project but as another learning point for the ferry sector in Kenya since it reflects 
the exact picture of the unexplored marine casualty investigation and gives a leeway for further 
studies in the same in order to improve in the future. 
One challenge contributed by the quality of reports was the difficulty in recognizing human error, 
especially in reports by non-technical personnel and more so in cases where newspaper reports 
were used. Media personnel are non-technical and may not always have access to the accident 
scene. To address the issue of quality of the media reports, an analysis had to be done to 
determine only those accidents with a high percentage of fatalities attributable to human error. In 
this case human error only included those errors leading directly to the accident. Overloading, 
collision, sailing in inclement weather after misjudgment, vessel maintenance are all examples of 
errors that were considered as factors. Due to the insufficiency of the casualty investigations 
reviewed, not all factors were included but for the reason of not trying to reinvestigate the 
accidents, only those factors explicitly mentioned in the reports were used for the analysis. 
Utilization of the HFACS framework and taxonomy in accident analysis involving domestic 
passenger ferries in Kenya was successful and the association between the reviewed accident 
investigation reports and the theoretical model was collaborative even though with limitations from 
some reports were not being sufficiently investigated. Human factors associated with the ferry 
owners gave a meaningful trend indicating that they played a role in both latent and active failures 
during accidents. Therefore, it is paramount for the ferry owners to underpin the causes of 
previous accidents and the reasons why the regulations in force have not enabled them to achieve 
maximum safety in the operation of the ferries. 
As a result of the lack of an independent accident investigation body in Kenya at the moment, the 
quality of marine casualty investigation is poor compared to the investigation reports of similar 
accidents that have been uploaded in the IMO GISIS platform from other nations. The same can 
also be said on the record keeping of the investigated cases. Incidents involving marine casualty 
investigation need to be properly documented and this can only be achieved with a proper 
understanding of the importance of IMO’s objective and the role of accident investigation. To 
achieve these objectives independence is key, not forgetting the incorporating of near misses as 
part of the investigation.  
With maritime education and training now being offered in the country, marine casualty 
investigation should be considered as an area of interest and be offered as a course locally. 
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Overall, the marine casualty investigation’s main aim is to contribute towards improving maritime 
safety and preventing similar incidents in future. Investigation reports are supposed to be centrally 
kept and the more serious cases forwarded to the IMO Secretariat and uploaded in the GISIS 
system for further reference and learning. The Likoni and Lamu channels should be considered 
as a hot spot for ferry accidents considering the busy ferry traffic operations thereto. 
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7 Recommendations  
It is not easy for an investigator to get all the facts together that contribute to an accident.  The 
nature of a human being during an accident investigation tends to be protective and therefore 
what a person reveals about the casualty is limited. In most cases, the major cause of an accident 
is masked and necessary the evidence destroyed. Commercial vessel owners may also reveal 
less information to protect their interests and in most cases hide behind classification society 
certificates and some may never even report a casualty. This has seen non genuine links created 
between vessel owners and other stakeholders like the administrator, the insurance and the users 
because they see accident reporting as a reflection of their weaknesses. The crew also does not 
want to take the responsibility for the accidents for fear of being fired or replaced and therefore 
not reporting is the easiest way to avoid blame.  
Flag states are also seeing accident investigations as an undesired expense and a bad reflection 
of their image. As a matter of fact, looking from both sides, there are a lot of contradictions that 
need to be approached carefully in the safety chain and managed properly to achieve maritime 
safety through proper maritime casualty investigation. Starting with ship design, construction, 
inspection, maritime administration, maritime education and training institutions, lending 
institutions, owners, crew, survivors all the way to insurance and P & I clubs, the list, though not 
exhaustive, indicates quite a number of parties that may be part of a marine casualty investigation. 
It also shows how complex marine accident investigations can become. From the analysis in this 
study, the author has suggested the following recommendations to reduce mishaps caused by 
human errors in the ferry industry in Kenya.  
Establishing an Independent investigation body 
The public uses the ferries often and has entrusted the maritime administration with their safety. 
Therefore, in order to have transparency and to avoid conflict of interest, accident investigation in 
Kenya must be totally separated from the responsible administrative organization that regulates 
and enforces policies as proposed in IMO’s Res. A.884 (21) that was adopted in May, 2008. 
Legislation should be promulgated and developed in respect to accident investigation to yield 
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credible reports for the regulators, operators and the public. A team of experts should also be 
established with proper academic qualifications and experience to carry out the duties as required 
during investigations. The investigation body should be formed with the aim not to blame or fault 
but to identify the causes of marine casualty and make recommendations to avoid similar 
accidents and incidents in the future so as to improve water transport (MCIB, 2017). 
A legislation to ensure that investigators have access rights to accident scenes and materials like 
VDR’s without intervention should also be put in place. Guidelines should be adopted from the 
IMO casualty investigation and local guidelines should be developed for the owners/operators of 
passenger ferries and their crew with respect to investigation. 
Creation of a central database and a confidential casualty reporting system 
A good example of such a system is the European Maritime Casualty Information Platform 
(EMCIP) which is a data distribution system and database intended for broadening the analysis 
of causality information, and providing ready information for the use to enable in identifying risk 
and documenting casualties. Simply for all those party to the ferry industry in Kenya to contribute 
towards the reduction of ferry accidents in Kenya, and to reduce the fatality rate involving ferry 
casualties, there must be a complete record of past incidents to draw lessons, just like the IMO, 
EMSA Worldwide Ferry Safety Association (WFSA) and the Interferry pledge. To ensure that no 
incident or accident goes unreported, a confidential casualty reporting system is encouraged with 
the aim that the reporting person’s identity shall not be disclosed but the reported cases will be 
fully investigated. 
A mailing list should also be established in order to ensure all relevant stakeholders receive the 
accident investigation reports. The database should also serve as reference material during future 
investigations and the reports should be protected from being amended or deleting some parts. 
Audit of the existing passenger ferries 
A thorough inspection of the current domestic passenger vessels against the required standards 
and according to the national regulations as stipulated in the merchant shipping act as this can 
eliminate unsafe acts of violations based on risk assessment, failing to comply with manuals, 
operating when unauthorised and violating standing orders and regulations. Audits can also prune 
out unqualified crews leading to ferries that are equipped with competent crew that can ensure 
that they are run in a safer manner. Also, if the owners and operators of the ferries could work 
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hand-in-hand with the maritime administrator, take caution and follow the rules and regulations 
developed for their safety rather than focus too much on making profits, they can improve safety. 
Training 
Training based on the team approach targeting the reduction of human error related accidents is 
necessary. This can be achieved through targeting various categories of stakeholders that include 
the administrative staff, the ferry owners and operators, the crew and the passengers or public in 
general. A more intensive and incentive based training is recommended for all captains and crew 
of the ferries in the country that involves low cost technologies and more intuitive items to help 
them learn the latest trends in the ferry industry and how they can use the latest technology in 
line with their duties to help reduce accidents. The promotion of such trainings at the Bandari 
College in Mombasa is necessary so as to encourage as many persons in the ferry sector to train. 
The investigators should also be trained, qualified and must be totally objective and uphold the 
utmost integrity during investigation with skills as outlined in resolution A.996 (25) for 
investigators. Knowing well that their conclusions and recommendations have far reaching 
consequences, they should demonstrate patience and understand relevant circumstances during 
the investigation. They should know what standards to apply in various situations and examine 
against those standards. 
The training institutions should also develop programs using guidelines as laid down in the IMO 
short courses so that a degree of uniformity is achieved to a global level. Also ensure that officers 
who return to these institutions for revalidation under the STCW convention undergo courses in 
accident investigation in the context of accident prevention. 
The ship Owner and operators 
The accident reporting culture should be the norm. Ship owners must ensure that not only the 
ship board managers, but all on board their vessels, are aware of their policy with respect to the 
investigation of events and how such a policy fits into the overall policy of ensuring safety at sea 
and reducing accidents caused by human error. They should also ensure that the management 
team on board their vessels are well prepared to contribute towards accident investigation through 
company education. 
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Bridge or tunnel for Likoni channel 
With the current upsurge of passengers using the Likoni Channel rising above 300,000 people 
per day, it is evident that unless the ferry operator secures more ferries, there is always going to 
be more stampedes from passenger scrambling for the minimum ferries available. One long term 
solution is a bridge or a tunnel from the Island to the Southern coast of Kenya through Likoni. Due 
to security reasons and the channel being considered an ISPS area because it serves as the 
approach to the port of Mombasa’s Kilindini harbour, a tunnel will be more viable and preferable 
than a bridge. This will have an impact on the latent failures which later manifest to active failures 
over a long term leading to ferry accidents in that channel. 
Weather reporting system 
Even though general weather is usually broadcasted by media houses, special marine weather 
should be given an up-to-the-minute broadcasting priority specifically to sea-going personnel for 
adequate planning. Therefore, a system that is capable of broadcasting daily and hourly and 
developing weather updates at sea is necessary so as to enable the operators and seafarers to 
prepare adequately. Unsafe weather conditions, strong winds and tides, storms or even tsunamis 
and cyclones pose safety danger to all vessels at sea.  An improved affordable weather 
information system will help even small business owners in the ferry industry to have situational 
awareness and in the long run improve safety and prevent loss of life due to weather related 
human factors. It is preferable to have an SMS system that can push messages from a central 
source, for example the RMRCC to the seafarers’ mobile phones as a complimentary weather 
broadcasting system. Such a system, by example, is the NOAA’s crowdsourcing weather data 
app for cell broadcasts alias the Meteorological Phenomena Identification near the Ground 
(MPING). 
Control of overcrowding and overloading 
The ferries offering services especially at the Likoni Channel are absolutely free whereas the rest 
are equally very cheap as compared to the other means of transport. This has made transport by 
water the cheapest and most preferable among many residents accessing the islands and 
mainland. The disadvantage of this has been an increased number of passengers that has led to 
overcrowding and overloading of the ferries. Increase in the number of passengers is an 
underlying risk and with time combined with one active failure can contribute towards an accident. 
The maritime administrator is needed to play a huge role by having more strict regulations and 
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penalties to the operators against overloading the ferries. Nowadays, there are technologies to 
count passengers as they pass through to board the vessel such that once the limit has been 
reached the vessel cannot take extra passengers. There are also weighing systems that are 
similar to elevator systems that can tell when the vessel’s maximum tonnage has been attained. 
The maritime administrator should ensure these systems are in place and working at all the 
boarding ramps or piers. 
On the other hand, it is easier to educate the public in general by holding campaigns on the ground 
and through media about their own safety and how they can contribute actively to ensure they are 
not part of the problem but rather a solution. In 2013 passengers in a Hong Kong vessel prevented 
it from departing when they noticed cargo blocking the exits. This was triggered by a lesson from 
a previous accident which occurred and where the loss of lives could have been prevented if the 
vessels exits were not blocked in the same way (Golden & Weisbrod, 2016). This showed that 
passengers in a known danger can actively contribute towards minimizing the risk they are aware 
facing them. 
Mass Rescue Operations 
Disasters will continue to happen globally and regularly but despite this, the multi-agency 
approach towards response has remained a poorly researched area (Chen et al. 2008, Salmon 
et al. 2011, & Salmon et al. 2014). Considering the vast SAR area that Kenya has, and very 
minimal rescue resources, involvement of other organizations with the help of the SAR 
coordination by the RMRCC Mombasa will improve the rescue services and minimize the number 
of fatalities. Mass rescue operations coupled with cooperation among the several state 
organizations and private agencies is necessary in order to ensure faster and more robust rescue 
services are availed in case there is a ferry accident 
Enforcing the ISM code in national legislation 
The MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7 (2008) section 9 of the ISM code promotes the reporting of near misses 
as this encourages promotion of a safety culture and also as an integral part of continually 
improving safety management systems. This will provide the marine casualty investigators a 
chance to be at bay from deducing blame to the sharp end which always points at the crew on 
board the vessel but rather gives investigation a holistic approach whereby, the more deep an 
investigation is carried out, the more factors will be identified, and if recommendations are 
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implemented this can improve the whole system in general. Also, because the ISM code is seen 
as the ideal instrument to address organizational factors (IMO, 2010). 
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Appendix I 
 
Causality Data List. 
DATE VESSEL'S 
NAME 
VESSE
L'S 
FLAG 
PLACE/REGION TYPE OF 
INCIDENT/ACCIDEN
T 
NO. OF 
DEATHS 
9/5/1982 MV. Eva   Mombasa Port 
Approach 
Grounding 0 
18/5/1983 MV. Sanko 
Cherry 
  Mombasa Port 
Approach 
Grounding 0 
7/10/1983 MV. 
Bateleur 
  South East Of 
Madagascar 
Capsizing 3 
1/6/1984 MV. Morea   Enroute to 
Kismayu 
Sinking 8 
19/6/1984 Kiboko/Alex
a 
Kenya/  Mombasa Port   Collision 0 
25/3/1987 Raudha   Off coast of Lamu Grounding 0 
27/8/1987 F.T. Jonay Spain Off coast of Lamu Man Overboard 1 
9/11/1987 MV. Silago 
Express 
  Mombasa Port 
Approach 
Grounding 0 
6/7/1988 Yatch 
Emirites 
N/A Mombasa Port Container Lifting 
failure 
0 
6/8/1988 MV. Harrier   South Coast Capsizing Unknown 
10/12/1988 MV. Atlantic 
Maru 
  Mombasa Port 
Approach 
Stranding 0 
24/5/1990 MV. Ujuzi   Off Malindi Grounding 9 
8/7/1990 MV. 
Bernora 
  Mombasa Port 
Approach 
Grounding 0 
5/1/1991 Hana   Off coast of 
Malindi 
Capsizing Unknown 
7/3/1992 Khairat Zanzibar Tanga Capsizing 10 
3/9/1992 Atiatularah
man 
  Old port 
Mombasa 
Grounding 0 
16/8/1993 M.V Indian 
Ocean 
Somalia Kilifi Sinking 0 
16/8/1994 MV. 
Ramora Bay 
  Off Coast of 
Somalia 
Sinking 1 
25/8/1994 M.V. Brats   Kilindini berth #4 Man Overboard 1 
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29/04/1994 Mtongwe 1 Kenya Likoni Channel Capsizing Apx. 270 
25/03/1995 Suzanne 
Delmas 
  Mombasa Port Heavy Contact 0 
30/5/1995 M.V. 
Bonsella 
Bahama
s 
Tanga Capsizing 0 
16/10/1995 M.V. Niyzao Kenya Tiwi South coast Capsizing 0 
24/01/1996 MT. 
Shareen 
Kingston Mombasa Port Heavy Contact 0 
22/9/1996 M.T. Johana     Grounding 0 
21/5/1997 MV. 
Nedlloyd 
Maine 
The 
Netherla
nds 
Mombasa Port Jammed Container 0 
5/7/1997 Jain Hong 
201 
  Off coast of 
Mombasa 
Sinking Unknown 
19/10/1997 M.V.Fadhil 
Karim 
  Old port 
Mombasa 
Sinking 0 
21/5/1998 SV. Iqbal   TZ/KN Boarder Capsizing 6 
11/1/2002 Hidaya N/A Kisite M. Park Sinking 0 
1/6/2005 Ahlam Kenya Lamu Man Overboard  1 
22/5/2005 MV. Ruaha   Mombasa Port Man Overboard 1 
2/7/2005 De La 
Franqueira/ 
Sanjeeda 
  Mombasa Port Heavy Contact 0 
5/23/2006 Fossil N/A Mtwapa Creek Capsizing 1 
8/10/2007 Barge 
Bartun 
N/A SECO repair yard Man overboard 1 
13/12/2007 M.V Asian 
Trader 
  Mombasa Port Stevedores collapsed 
in cargo hold 
0 
14/6/2008 M.T. Rhino   Off Mombasa 
coast 
Towing rope accident 1 
4/7/2008 M.V. Kairos   AMGECO Dry 
dock 
Fire Unknown 
17/9/2008 Al-Itifaq & 
Afuwa 
  Lamu Collision 1 
4/11/2008 Onega I Panama Sea Death of crew  1 
11/12/2008 B. Spacial Kenya Kisumu Port Man Overboard 1 
8/9/2009 Tusitiri   Mtwapa Capsizing 1 
02/05/10 Elbaron   L Victoria Capsizing 1 
06/06/10 Kirande   L Victoria Capsizing 2 
06/06/10 Mzee Adero   L Victoria Capsizing 2 
06/06/10 Jerusalem   L Victoria Capsizing 2 
12/8/2010 MV.S. 
Cunene/ Ibi 
  Mombasa Port Collision 0 
17/8/2010 O. Janabi   Rambira beach Capsizing 3 
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19/9/2010 One love   Pirates beach Sinking  0 
4/10/2010 TCG 
Gokceada 
Turkey Likoni Chanel Grounding 0 
07/10/10 Salome   L Victoria Capsizing 6 
17/10/10 MT FAITH   MOMBASA Man overboard 1 
01/11/10 O. Nyomogi   L Victoria Capsizing 19 
27/08/2011 Lulu Kenya Mtwapa Creek Capsizing 0 
15/9/2011 MV. Kwale/ 
Sea Wind 
Kenya/  Mombasa Port Contact 0 
26/09/2011 MV Yusra  Mukowe Contact 0 
24/11/2011 Kaya   Sigir crossing 
point 
Capsizing 17 
29/11/2011 MV. Blida/ 
Kota Nekad 
Singapo
re 
Mombasa Port Heavy Contact 0 
1/1/2012 Safina/ Al-
Intisam 
Kenya/ 
Kenya 
Lamu Collision 20 
22/01/2012 Shufaa Kenya Lamu  Capsizing 5 
06/02/2012 Unknown Kenya Nyandiwa beach  Capsizing 2 
23/02/2012 Patrickmutu
a 
Kenya L. Chala  Capsizing 4 
09/04/2012 M.V Mara/ 
Manda 
Kenya Manda jetty  Collision 0 
21/08/2012 Millenium Kenya Watamu  Capsizing 0 
3/11/2012 MV. Chang 
Tai Hong 
Hong 
Kong 
Mombasa Port Injury to Personnel 1 
18/12/2012 Sara Dayo Kenya River Nyando Capsizing 5 
21/1/2013 Intl’ Medical 
Corps 
Kenya Off Mfangano 
Island 
Loss of Stability 0 
25/01/2013 MV. Likoni  Likoni Channel Barrier failure 11 
14/04/2013 Sifa Ya 
Bwana 
Kenya L. Turkana – 
Turkana county 
Drowning 9 
24/4/2013 MT. 
Ambrosia 
  Mombasa Port Pilot Ladder failure - 
Drowning 
1 
11/07/2013 Maverick Kenya Diani  Shipwrecked 0 
27/07/2013 M.V Hodari Kenya Kiwayu  Mechanical problem 0 
06/08/2013 Ombembe Kenya Lake Jipe Capsizing 1 
30/10/2013 MV. Zella 
Oldendrff 
Malta Mombasa Port Heavy Weight 
Crushing 
1 
10/01/2014 Kukhu 
Nang'oma 
Kenya Sumba Channel 
(L. Victoria) 
Capsizing 0 
01/05/2014 Mkizi Kenya Mld Marine Park Not stated 0 
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20/11/2014 KWS boat Kenya Msa Marine park Capsizing 4 
2/1/2015 Kitezi Kenya Diani  Capsizing 4 
10/1/2015 Alsamadi Kenya Diani  Flooding 15 
14/01/2015 MV. Andrea Kenya Lamu Mechanical Failure 0 
19/01/2015 MV. Bilaal Kenya Kisite mpunguti  Grounding 12 
6/4/2015 Jet Ski-Boat Kenya white sands  Capsizing 12 
25/05/2015 MV Waamo 
Star 
Kenya Malindi M. Park Flooding 0 
24/7/2015 MV Alsham Kenya Lamu Capsizing 5 
22/9/2015 FV Vega Kenya Mambrui Malindi Grounding 20 
19/10/2015 Kahawa Kenya Mombasa  Drifting 2 
11/11/2015 MV. Kwale Kenya Likoni Channel Grounding 0 
20/01/2016 Rangi Kenya Shimoni Sinking 4 
28/02/2016 Nuzla Kenya Lamu - Manda 
bay 
Capsizing 2 
11/3/2016 Kenya Navy Kenya Magogoni Capsizing Unknown 
17/05/2016 Zuhura Kenya Shimoni Mechanical failure 5 
6/6/2016 MV 
Harambee 
Kenya Likoni Channel Ditched 1 
9/6/2016 Al -Ikhlas  Kenya Mkandani  Capsizing 18  
09/06/2016 MV. Kilindini Kenya Likoni Channel Man Overboard 1 
13/06/2016 Mombasa 1 Kenya English point Capsizing 6 
7/7/2016 Likoni 1 Kenya Diani  Capsizing 4 
26/7/2016 Mastakher II Kenya Pemba channel Engine Failure 5 
29/7/2016 Tamu Kenya Mtwapa Drowning 4 
17/08/2016 Hamza Kenya Diani - Tiwi Capsizing 2 
24/08/2016 Bishara Kenya Lamu Capsizing 4 
29/08/2016 Zabar Kenya Lamu - Kiunga Capsizing 5 
6/9/2016 Mashallah Kenya Msambweni Capsizing 16 
17/9/2016 Mv. Nyayo Kenya Likoni Channel  Engine Failure 0 
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Appendix II 
 
Coding Human Factor as retrieved from the reports 
Only the human factors to be analyzed have been retrieved from the reports that are within the 
scope of shipping operators, the crew and the maritime administration. Other factors like the 
shipping operator’s unsafe acts and maintenance will be discussed as indicated in the reports. 
 
1. Mtongwe 1 
Accident information sheet 
Accident no.: 1 
Date:  27/04/1994 
Accident category: Sinking 
Ship involved:  MV Mtongwe I 
Length:   
Breath:  
Tonnage:  
Build when:  
Build where: 
Operator: KFS 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  27/04/1994 
Accident time:  
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Injuries: 270 lost lives 
Casualties: 400 
Total loss: Yes 
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The Herald) 
Summary of the accident: The vessel was designed to carry a maximum of 300 people. On the 
fateful day the vessel had 400 onboard from Mtongwe to Mombasa. The ferry as reported, always 
carried in excess during the rush hours and had always crossed the channel safely. On the fateful 
day it was crammed tight with people. It appeared overloaded and swayed violently. It capsized 
and sank about 40 meters away from the mainland. A total number of 272 lives were lost in the 
accident. 
 
Unsafe Acts 
Violation - Routine violation (AV 400) 
To proceed with an overloaded ship. 
Pre-conditions 
Cognitive factors – Overconfidence (PC 100) 
According to the report – the ferry was always overloaded during rush hours 
Personnel factors - Personal readiness (PP 200) 
Disregard for rules and instructions combined with poor judgement 
Unsafe supervision 
Supervisory violations – Shipborne Violations (SV 000) 
If the ferry was overloaded on a regular basis and the management failed to correct the action on 
board, they have acted negligently and enabled the accident to happen. 
Organizational influence 
Organizational climate – culture (OC 200) 
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If the ferry was overloaded on a regular basis and the management failed to correct the action on 
board, they have acted negligently and enabled the accident to happen. 
Outside factors/Statutory - Flag State (FS – 100) 
If there were there any rules, procedures and authorized personnel in place to notice and stop 
this development. 
 
2. MV. Kwale/ Sea Wind 
Accident information sheet 
Accident no.: 2 
Date:  15/09/2011 
Accident category: Contact 
Ship involved:  MV Kwale/Sea wind 
Length:  75/119.014 
Breath: 16.05M/18.6 
Tonnage: 637/6425 
Build when: 2010/1988 
Build where: 
Operator: KFS 
When the ship was taken over by the operator: KFS/Liberia 
Accident date:  15/09/2011 
Accident time:  
Injuries: none 
Casualties:  
Total loss: No 
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Source of information about the accident: KMA 
Summary of the accident: The vessel Sea Wind was fast and secure on the wharf from 
September 10th waiting to overload. Kwale was underway crossing the channel from mainland 
on 15th sept the Ro-Ro Passenger Ferry made contact with the Liberian registered general cargo 
ship, MV. Sea Wind at the Mbaraki Wharf, along the Kilindini Harbor Channel where according to 
the report she had been secured by port pilots with a 15m overhang towards the ferry landing for 
a period of five days. On the 5th day the coxswain had just taken over shift and that was his first 
voyage. In the report, the Coxswain said he lost control of the vessel due to steering failure. But 
after the contact he continued with normal operation of the vessel. It was established that the 
vessel did cause contact as a result of suffering mechanical failure but due to not factoring in the 
incoming tide. 
 
Unsafe acts 
Errors - Decision and judgment errors (AE 200) 
(AE 205) - Failed to pay attention to incoming and rising tide and the effects this causes to the 
vessel 
(AE 201) - Failed to realize the importance of the use of navigational equipment in this situation 
Pre-conditions 
Environmental factors – Physical environment (PE 100) 
- Strong flooding and tides 
- Movement of the vessel 
Outside factors – Statutory  
Port State (FS 000) - No supervision of ship movements in the area 
 
3. MV. Safina/ Al-Intisam 
Accident information sheet 
Accident no.: 3 
Date:  2/1/2012 
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Accident category: Collision 
Ship involved:  MV Safina/Al-Intsam 
Length:   
Breath:  
Tonnage:  
Build when:  
Build where: 
Operator: Private 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  1/1/2012 
Accident time: 0030hrs 
Injuries: 20 lives lost 
Casualties: 82 
Total loss: Yes 
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The Telegraph) 
Summary of the accident: This is a commuter passenger vessel which collided with another 
vessel at night while carrying about 82 passengers on board. 43 passengers were saved while 9 
bodies were recovered. The report does not give further account of the missing persons but a 
total of 20 persons died. The passenger ferry was intentionally overloaded with people and 
baggage and both vessels had no navigational lights. They were operating in the dark when they 
collided. According to the report before the boat left a police officer tried to stop it but the operator 
talked him out. The report blamed boat operators for not observing safety regulations. 
 
Unsafe acts 
Violation – Routine (AV 400)  
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No navigation light on 
Violation – Routine (AV 400) 
Overloading the vessel 
Pre-conditions 
Environmental factors – Physical Environment (PE 100) 
It was night time 
Environmental factors – Technological Environment (PE 200) 
Both vessels were missing navigational lights 
Organizational Influences 
Organizational climate – culture (OC 200) 
No safety culture – when police tried to prevent the ferry from leaving, management interfered 
and told the captain to proceed. 
Outside factors 
Statutory - Port State (FS 000) 
No sufficient enforcement powers to local police – an officer warned the captain, but he was 
instructed by management to still proceed 
 
4. MV Bassaam 
Accident information sheet 
Accident no.: 4 
Date:  20/06/2016 
Accident category: Sinking 
Ship involved:  MV Bassaam 
Length:  69m 
 74 
Breath: 14m 
Tonnage:  
Build when:  
Build where: 
Operator: Private 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  20/06/2016 
Accident time:  
Injuries: 20 lives lost 
Casualties: 128 
Total loss: No 
Source of information about the accident: KMA 
Summary of the accident: On 20th June 2017, the vessel started her journey at Lamu Palace 
with passenger lifesaving appliances on board safely locked away. Thirty minutes into the journey, 
a stronger gush of wind hit the vessel and efforts to realign it to a safe speed and position failed 
as the captain lost control. The vessel took in water from the bow, flooded and sunk. According 
to the report, the captain did not have any formal training and certification, but had an experience 
of over thirty years on sailing. From the report, there are indications that the captain did not take 
into consideration the fact that from June to August season, the region is known for intermittent 
rains with strong winds and rough seas. From previous records, there are higher number of 
vessels capsizing in that season. The captain did not consider that and the report further says he 
was ill prepared, delayed and failed to correct the vessels position to  counter the strong wind and 
control the vessel when she was hit by a sudden gush of wind. The vessel tripped on the fore due 
to the force of the wind and took in water from the bow, further loading the vessel, gradually 
exhausting the spare buoyancy and subsequently capsizing the vessel. The high number of 
fatalities was contributed by lack of floatation devices. 20 lives were lost due to poor judgement 
on the part of the captain, lack of life saving appliances and trading a passenger vessel in rough 
seas contrary to laid down safety regulations and guidelines. 
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Unsafe Acts 
Violation – Routine (AV 400) 
To operate a ship without proper training. 
Violation – Exceptional (AV 500) 
Not to provide safety instructions prior to departure. 
Errors - Perceptual errors (AE 300) 
Lack of situational awareness  
Preconditions  
Environmental factors – physical environment (PE 100) 
Sudden wind forces 
Personnel factors - Personal readiness (PP 200) 
Lack of training 
Organizational influence 
Organizational climate – culture 
A captain without any formal training has been employed to operate the ship 
 
5. MV Kwale 
Accident information sheet 
Accident no.: 5.  
Date:  11/11/2015 
Accident category:  Grounding 
Ship involved:  MV Kwale 
Length: 75M 
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Breath: 16.05 
Tonnage: 637 RT 
Build when: 
Build where: 
Operator:  Kenya Ferry Services 
When the ship was taken over by the operator: 14/06/2010 
Accident date:  11/11/2015 
Accident time:  
Injuries:  several persons 
Casualties: Approx. 1000 
Total loss: No 
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The standard media) 
Summary of the accident: The vessel lost power in one of the generators that power the vessels 
engines and stalled. This led to the vessel drifting for about 1 kilometer from the channel where it 
hit a coral reef and grounded with approximately 1000 passengers on board. Several passengers 
in fright jumped overboard to swim to the shore. Several persons sustained injuries from the 
impact of hitting the rock. The other passengers waited for up to four hours until another ferry MV 
Kilindini, Kenya Navy vessel and two tug boats were deployed to rescue the vessel and evacuate 
the passengers. The vessel was refloated after the tide was high later on. 
 
The information given about Kwale was not sufficient to code individual human factors involved 
in the accident. 
 
6.  MV Yusra 
Accident no.: 6.  
Date:  26/09/2011 
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Accident category:  Contact 
Ship involved:  MV Yusra 
Length:  
Breath:  
Tonnage:  
Build when: 
Build where: 
Operator: Private 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  26/09/2011 
Accident time: 1330 hrs 
Injuries: none 
Casualties:  
Total loss: No 
Source of information about the accident: (KMA) 
Summary of the accident: On 26 September 2011 MV Yusra struck the end of a breakwater 
while departing from Mukowe for passage to Lamu Island. The ferry’s bow was damaged but the 
vessel returned to its berth without assistance. The impact resulted in several minor injuries to 
passengers and crew. There was no pollution. The contact with the breakwater resulted from a 
loss of directional control as Yusra turned towards the harbour’s eastern entrance. The ferry’s 
engines were set to ‘full astern’ and the starboard anchor was let go, but these actions did not 
prevent the ferry from running into the breakwater at 3.5kts. No announcement was made by the 
coxswain to warn the passengers and crew. The loss of directional control was due to a change 
in the mode the steering control system was operating. The change in steering mode was not 
intentionally initiated and remains unexplained. The response of the bridge team was positive but 
the action to stop the ferry was taken too late.  
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Unsafe Acts 
Errors - Skill based errors (AE 100) 
Unintentional and unnoticed change of steering mode 
Errors - Decision and judgement errors (AE 200) 
Late recognition that manoeuvres are not carried out as planned 
The error is not explained in the accident information. There are some actions to prevent the 
accident described, but it is unclear how they were carried out. The information is not sufficient to 
add further coding in respect to Preconditions for unsafe acts or other organizational factors. 
 
7. MV Hodari 
Accident no.: 7.  
Date:  09/08/2013 
Accident category:  Contact 
Ship involved:  MV Hodari 
Length:  
Breath:  
Tonnage:  
Build when: 
Build where: 
Operator: Private 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  25/07/2013 
Accident time: 1330 hrs 
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Injuries: none 
Casualties: 70 
Total loss: Yes 
Source of information about the accident: (KMA) 
Summary of the accident: The passenger vessel departed Kiwayu to Lamu at 1330hrs, several 
minutes into her voyage, there was total blackout on board the vessel due to power failure causing 
panic to passengers. This was due to loss of power and malfunction in the engine room system 
that caused a total power failure onboard the vessel. According to the report the captain had had 
several such incidents and had reported to the owner for the past whole year. The vessel kept 
drifting for several hours until deployed rescue boats from Marine police unit and the Kenya Navy 
evacuated the passengers the following day. The incident was reported to the rescue centre 5 
hours later by the owner of the vessel. All passengers were safely evacuated but the vessel ran 
aground on coral rock and sank on the 27/07/2013. 
The information is not sufficient to code the unsafe act leading to the accident. However, it is clear 
that the engine was not fully operational at the time of the accident as several instances with 
engine problems were reported during the year prior to the accident. 
Preconditions for unsafe acts 
Environmental factors - Technical environment (PE 200) 
Vessel operating with a damaged engine. 
Unsafe supervision 
Inadequate supervision – Shipborne and shore supervision (SI 000) 
Shore based management deficiencies 
Organizational influences 
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200) 
 Owner did not react to earlier reports of engine problems 
 Owner reported the accident only 5 hours after it occurred 
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Statutory - Flag State (FS 100) 
There is no evidence of regular inspections of this vessel 
8. MV. Kilindini 
Accident no.: 8 
Date:  09/06/2016 
Accident category: Vehicle and Person overboard 
Ship involved:  MV Kilindini 
Length:  
Breath:  
Tonnage:  
Build when: 
Build where: 
Operator: KFS 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  09/06/2016 
Accident time:  
Injuries: 1 person died 
Casualties: 1 
Total loss: No 
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper, KMA 
Summary of the accident: A private vehicle on board the ferry erroneously engaged its reverse 
gear with the driver still inside and plunged into the sea. The vehicle slid from the ferry at Likoni 
Channel. The vehicle took close to 30 minutes to sink as the occupant struggled to break out of 
it. Unfortunately according to the report, there were no divers onboard and the ferry crew only 
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threw a life ring to the vehicle driver even though still trapped. The vessel proceeded with its 
journey across the channel. The occupant of the vehicle drowned to death after the vehicle sank. 
The ferry management defended the crew for only throwing a life ring to the deceased. The ferry 
operator KFS relies on volunteer divers and SAR services for other organizations like KMA, 
Maritime police, Kenya navy and KPA. The operator as well does not have any specialized diving 
equipment for emergency cases. 
 
Pre-conditions 
Environmental factors - Technological environment (PE 200) 
Inappropriate physical barriers to prevent the car from going overboard 
Personnel factors – Personal readiness (PP 200) 
Inappropriate response to the accident and no support given to the struggling driver 
Organizational influence 
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200) 
The response to the accident could be an indicator for a lacking safety culture. There do not seem 
to be good emergency plans in place or any assessments made of likely accident scenarios and 
how to react in such a situation. 
 
9. MV. Likoni 
Accident no.: 9 
Date:  25/01/2013 
Accident category: Barrier failure 
Ship involved:  MV Likoni 
Length:  75 
Breath: 16 
Tonnage:  
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Build when: 2010 
Build where: 
Operator: KFS 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  2010 
Accident date:  25/01/2013 
Accident time:  
Injuries: 11 persons died 
Casualties: 1000 
Total loss: No 
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The daily Nation) 
Summary of the accident: While loading the vessel in Likoni Mombasa, a trailer descending the 
ramp failed its breaks, lost control and caught passengers and cyclists who were already onboard 
unaware and killed 11 of them and injured 20 others. Vehicles are loaded in to the ferry first before 
cyclists and passengers come on board. In this case, the loaded trailer was descending the ramp 
while passengers and cyclists were on board.  
 
The information is not sufficient to code the unsafe act leading to the trailer moving into the 
passenger area. 
 
Pre-conditions 
Environmental Factors - Technological environment (PE 200) 
Failed breaks 
Technological environment (PE 200) 
In appropriate design of the ramp and the terminal to prevent such accidents 
Unsafe Supervision 
Supervisory violations – Shipborne violations (SV 000) 
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The system was that normally the trailer should be moved on board first and thereafter 
passengers and cyclists should be allowed to get on board. 
It is unclear from the report if the operator or the authorities can be blamed further for allowing a 
risky operation. It would require more information to allow for such coding. 
 
10. MV Nyayo 
Accident no.: 10 
Date:  17/09/2016 
Accident category: Engine failure 
Ship involved:  MV Nyayo 
Length:  75m 
Breath: 16m 
Tonnage:  
Build when:  
Build where: 
Operator: KFS 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  17/09/2016 
Accident time: 0615hrs 
Injuries: none 
Casualties: 1000 
Total loss: No 
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The daily Nation), KMA 
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Summary of the accident: According to the report MV Nyayo was presumed not to be in a good 
condition by management when the ferry operator allowed it to continue offering services due to 
a breakdown of two other ferries. During that early morning, the sea was rough with current swells 
and heavy rains. The ferry developed mechanical problems with over 1000 persons on board and 
was swept away by the heavy tides and currents to deep sea. Tug boats from KPA secured the 
vessel and towed the vessel after several reinforcements.  The operator KFS‘ management 
warned the passengers about the rough weather after the incident.  
 
Unsafe act 
Errors - Decision and judgement error (AE 200) 
To allow for the operation of an unsuitable ferry in severe weather conditions. 
Pre-conditions 
Environmental factors - Technological environment (PE 200) 
Unsuitable ferry  
Physical environment (PE 100) 
Severe weather and sea conditions 
Unsafe Supervision 
Inadequate supervision - Shipborne and shore supervision (SI 000) 
The ship was not in good condition and this was known 
Organizational 
Organizational process – Oversight (OP 200) 
Two ferries were already out of order 
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200) 
Lacking safety culture when allowing an unseaworthy ship to fill in for other ferries 
Statutory - Port and Flag State (FS 100) 
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No measures in place to prevent such ferry from operating 
 
11. MV Harambee 
Accident no.: 11 
Date:  24/11/2015 
Accident category: Mechanical failure 
Ship involved:  MV Harambee 
Length:  75 
Breath: 16 
Tonnage:  
Build when:  
Build where: 
Operator: KFS 
When the ship was taken over by the operator:  
Accident date:  24/11/2015 
Accident time:  
Injuries:  
Casualties: 1000 
Total loss: No 
Source of information about the accident: Newspaper (The daily Nation), KMA 
Summary of the accident: The ferry developed a mechanical problem and overshot a ramp 
while trying to land on the mainland in South Coast, Likoni. According to the report the ferry was 
operating despite being faulty. The report further indicated the ferry had stuck on the rump on 
Mombasa Island 10 days earlier. And a week before, the management of KFS had said that the 
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ferry needed urgent replacement of two engines but financial constraints had made them to 
continue using the vessel. 
 
Unsafe act 
Errors - Decision and judgement error (AE 200) 
To allow for the operation of an unsuitable (damaged) ferry 
Pre-conditions 
Environmental Factors - Technological environment (PE 200) 
The ferry was defective and had known problems with engines etc. 
Supervision 
Inadequate supervision - Shipborne and shore based (SI 000) 
The ship was not in good condition and this was known 
Organizational influences 
Organizational climate – Culture (OC 200) 
Lacking safety culture when allowing an unseaworthy ship to operate for economic reasons 
Resource management - Technological resources (OR 100) 
No repairs of a defective ship 
Statutory - Port and Flag State (FS 100) 
No measures in place to prevent such ferry from operating 
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Appendix III 
 
Ferry incident & accident pictures in Kenya 
 
Figure: Passengers on a ferry in Likoni Mombasa  
Source: Business daily(2015 
 
Fig: A passenger vessel capsizes after colliding 
with a cargo boat. Source: world bulletin (2012) 
 
Fig: Uncontrolled number of passengers boarding ferry  
Source: Baraka (2016) 
 
Fig: A vehicle loses control and rams into a ferry 
Source: The EAS (2013)  
 
Fig: Passengers cause stampede after two ferries stall. 
Source: Capital (2015) 
 
Fig: A ferry is swept away by strong tides in 
Likoni channel. Source: Daily nation (2017) 
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Fig: Marine police recover a body after capsize of MV 
Safina.  
Source: The telegraph (2012) 
 
Fig: Passengers disembark MV Kwale from make-
shift landing after grounding.  
Source: The star (2015) 
 
 
Fig: Overcrowded passengers on board MV Harambee. 
Source: The daily nation (2010) 
 
Fig: Passengers in a crowded ferry in 2015 
Source: Baraka (2015) 
 
Fig: A track loading into the ferry tumbled and killed 11 
people. 
Source: The daily Nation (2013) 
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